

# Marine Corps Gazette

NOVEMBER 1955

FORTY CENTS



The Genesis of FMF Doctrine, V


# Marine Corps Gazette

NOVEMBER 1955  
NUMBER  
VOLUME

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## COVER



Back when battleships had basket masts the Marine in the field shouldered a Krag rifle and ate his meals from a condiment can. But even then, out of the experience that stemmed from the problems of defending advanced bases in the far-flung seaways, was born the amphibious doctrine that led to victory in WW II. The doctrine proved sound and the Corps had its *raison d'être*. Today the planning and testing go on—the helicopter replacing the whaleboat and new tactics replacing the old. In its 180th year, we can be sure the Corps will continue to keep pace and remain a potent force—thanks to the men who have made it.

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**VALLEY OF DESTRUCTION** was the main street of Winsted, Conn. Among the first to get through the floods was a telephone truck carrying emergency power equipment to provide service in the flooded telephone exchange at the lower end of the street.



**TELEPHONE MEN GO TO WORK BY BOAT** to speed drying of equipment in telephone exchange at Putnam, Conn., where service was provided by temporary switchboard on higher ground. In Stroudsburg, Pa., linemen and operators were flown in helicopters.



**OUTRACING THE FLOODS.** Radio-telephone service was set up at strategic points even before the floods reached their peak. Man in automobile makes emergency call while Mayor Moule of Phillipsburg, N. J., and telephone man stand by.

## The Deluge of Diane

**Hurricane floods emphasized the value of the telephone and the teamwork of telephone people in emergencies**

Seldom has a water-borne disaster struck with more concentrated fury than the floods of Hurricane Diane, which hit several eastern states.

"I never saw anything so terrifying in my life as when that river came down," said the telephone manager in Winsted, Connecticut.

Out of the havoc of the floods have come countless stories of courage and the good American spirit of helping one another in times of trouble.

Among them are heart-warming tributes to the telephone men and women who kept service going and worked so

hard to restore it wherever lines had been washed out. Together with the Red Cross, Salvation Army, National Guard, Civil Defense workers and all their neighbors in the stricken communities, they did their part in the tremendous job of rescue and restoration.


Many former telephone operators and those off duty reported back to their jobs. Trained, experienced crews from the telephone companies and Western Electric moved in fast with equipment and supplies and worked 'round the clock.

Disaster comes suddenly. But wherever it strikes you can depend on telephone people to do everything possible to provide you with telephone service.

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# message center



## Browne Side Out

... We, here at the Barracks, have been testing the Sam Browne Belt.

Believe me, the belt has met with considerable approval here, and certainly the word should be put out.

One month ago, we here at "Eighth and Eye" were summoned to the detachment office. As the officers filed in, each saw lying across the Commanding Officer's desk, a neat pile of 25 Sam Browne Belts. The belts had just arrived from the Uniform Board at Headquarters. Our orders were simple: Shine them and be ready to wear them at the next parade.

In the short time the belts have been worn here at "Eighth and Eye" there hasn't been one unfavorable comment. A far cry from the days of binding straps across the shoulder and unsightly yawing of the blue coat. After wearing them for only a month, I'M SOLD. We now have an opportunity to do away with that cloth belt—let's do it. Nothing feels better and looks sharper than a gleaming Sam Browne.

Of course the decision to retain or reject does not fall upon the officers at Marine Barracks. We have merely tested them.

Already, however, the reactions have been felt here at the Barracks—all favorable.

I couldn't help noticing the expressions on the faces of my fellow officers. On Parade Day everyone stood just a little straighter, and looked a little prouder. The Sam Browne Belt is back. **LET'S KEEP IT!**

1STLT FRANK H. MITCHELL, JR.  
MB, Washington, DC

... As a Britisher, I was, of course, brought up on the Sam Browne belt; and I shall always regard it as an excellent example of what a belt should be—and do. In pre-1914 days, and for some years onwards, it was found to hold the sword comfortably, while you could slide on both pistol holster and cartridge pouch, and hook on a map case. To support these extra burdens an extra sling was provided, although not often utilized. Holster, pouch, map case and sword frog could be removed at will. So could the belt, as was always the case on returning to quarters and before entering the anteroom. Of course no one, save the Orderly Officer, sat down to a meal in it; and it was even discarded in Company Office, save on formal occasions—such as defaulters.

The (British) belt made of the same material as the service uniform was an innovation of late 1917-early 1918, if memory serves, and was devised to give a little *finish* to the tunic on those odd

occasions when one appeared minus the Sam Browne—i.e. when, on service, dining out; when tunic and slacks were worn. Until somewhat violently discouraged, I even wore the Sam Browne with British battle dress, and shed it with regret, since no more satisfactory substitute has, to date, been produced. Of course the Sam Browne and a tummy do not go well together; which may account for its outlawry in some quarters.

MAJ R. HARGREAVES, MC (RET)  
England

## The Helicopter—A Godsend

... Relative to *The Helicopter—an Airplane Not a 6 x 6* herewith are the thoughts of a gravel cruncher who has witnessed the immeasurable value of those flying AKAs in, if you will pardon the expression, a 6 x 6 role.

The logistical support given to the 1st Bn, 7th Marines during the occupation and defense of hill 495 (meters) from September to December 1953 cannot be measured by an aviation yardstick alone. It can, however, be measured on the 1st Mar Div *preparedness* yardstick with extremely gratifying results, in that the back-breaking task of organizing this rugged, split, dominating terrain was accomplished with the maximum use of helicopters, in a logistical role, months ahead of the original estimated schedule. Time and memory does not permit the enumeration of the many items flown to hill 495, but I distinctly recall the expressions of sincere gratification on the faces of crunchies and aviators alike when the CO 1st Bn, 7th Marines presented the CO of HMR 161 a celebration cake in recognition of lifting more than ONE MILLION lbs. to that pick and shovel swinging battalion on the high ground.

I should now like to read an article, preferably by an aviator, titled *The Helicopter—an Airplane, a 6 x 6, an LCVP and a Godsend*.

CAPT ROBERT E. HOSKINS  
Quantico, Va.

## The Long, the Short etc.

... In regards to LtCol Heinel's article on *Sensible Summer Uniforms*—can anyone disagree with him? Our Corps should adopt short trousers with long socks and short sleeve, open collar shirts immediately, if not sooner!

For the last 5 months I have been cruising around the Med on a cruiser, and our in-port summer uniform is Summer "A" (sometimes Summer Service "C" for officers). It's ridiculous. In every country we visited, the armed forces of that country have a summer uniform similar to that advocated by LtCol Heinel! These people take one

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look at us, sweating and gasping for air, and immediately decide we're looney! I agree. I have seen an Italian naval officer in the *short pants* uniform who was one of the sharpest customers I have ever run across. The Royal Marines on Malta can't be beat in their shorty rig. At a lunch with the Duke of Wellington's regiment on Gibraltar last week, a British officer (in shorts etc.) said to me, "I say, why do you chaps wear that?" Of course, I couldn't give him an answer.

It wasn't too long ago that I was down at Basic School running field problems in the summer heat. All the instructors were well cautioned and schooled on sunstroke and heat prostration. However, we all continued to charge around in 100° temperatures wearing our utilities—of course with long sleeves and long trousers tucked into boots. It makes my eyes water to think of it now.

Here's a vote for the uniform LtCol Heinel recommends. Let's have it *right now*, and to the devil with those who would vote *no* because they are ashamed of their bony knees!

CAPT WILLIAM K. ROCKEY  
USS Salem (CA 139)

... I just received today's issue of the *GAZETTE* and am enjoying it as usual. I just read LtCol R. D. Heinel's *Sensible Summer Uniforms*.

Please let me enter my vote against the Colonel's proposed uniform that includes shorts. Awhile back when I read that the Air Force was considering the wearing of them I said, I sure hope the Marine Corps never adopts them.

I do not see how a Marine can look like a Marine in shorts. We are men and not sissies. I do not say that every man who wears shorts is a sissy. But I say that every man who wears shorts looks like a sissy.

CPL THOMAS R. CARROLL  
Miami, Fla.

... In regard to the article *Sensible Summer Uniforms* by LtCol R. D. Heinel, Jr., I have nothing but high praises.

I am extremely gratified that LtCol Heinel is so acutely aware of the shortcomings of our present summer service uniforms. I hope that his article speeds up the day when we will be wearing a sensible and military summer uniform.

TSGT LOUIS W. SLATER  
Parris Island, SC

... The article by LtCol Heinel excellently portrays the need for a sensible summer uniform, especially regarding shirts.

Speaking of the minority, however, was the appearance of those whose legs

bend in an outward curve and those whose legs bend in an inward curve considered?

If the idea were adopted in its entirety, perhaps a *summer-training* program (April through September) in Alaska, Iceland and/or Argentina for those unfortunates in the above paragraph would receive favorable comment.

MSGT JOHN A. EAZARSKY  
New York, NY

... There were some fine ideas about summer uniforms in LtCol Heinel's article but ... I wonder if the Colonel has ever had to fight a pair of knee-length stockings ... that is, try to keep them above the ankles after a couple of washings.

The bush jacket might be cool, but what would it look like after a couple of hours wear? ... especially if it were a washable material.

1STLT F. ZIMOLZAK  
USS Randolph (CVA-15)

... The September issue gave me more pleasure than any I've read. The articles by LtCol R. D. Heinel, Jr. and Capt Bill Davis were logical expressions of dissatisfaction with two of the Corps' most basic problems.

It's time the Uniform Board approached the summer uniform difficulty with a fresh-minded attitude; comfort and appearance, rather than custom should be the key. Lieutenant Colonel Heinel hits a grand slam with his proposals, but cloth and tailors can only cover just so many sins. We should also concentrate on the hardening and streamlining program suggested by Capt Davis. Do away with the pot-bellies and ample *derrieres*, trim them and slim them, give them a cool, sharp uniform then winter and summer the Marines will be razor-sharp.

CAPT FRANCIS W. TIEF  
Hartford, Conn.

... After considerable reflection on *Sensible Summer Uniforms*, I must admit the Colonel has dispelled much of my prejudice against shorts. However, I would like to offer the following comments.

First, in the last 9 years there have been a number of uniform modifications that have resulted in untold confusion with respect to the troops—not to mention the pecuniary loss.

If there is a contemplated change, may I be permitted to offer the suggestion? Go slow, be sure it is right.

Secondly, the trend today seems to be toward tailoring the uniform to look less like a uniform and more along the lines of a business suit. I, for one, like to feel that the uniform I wear—whether

it be the field or dress blue—distinguishes me as a member of the military profession, and if comfort must be sacrificed for style to achieve that end, I am willing to pay the price.

Thirdly, I would like to mention the distinguishable similarity between the illustrated summer uniforms of Col Heinel and the depicted new uniforms of the US Air Force on page 63 of the same issue; in fact they are practically identical. Admittedly, there is little latitude for originality in designing a short-sleeved shirt and trousers uniform, but again permit me to remonstrate. If there is a contemplated change, please design the summer uniform in a style which will give us the stamp of professional military men and not the appearance and feeling of being dressed in a leisurely fashion for a summer vacation.

TSGT RICHARD C. MARTIN  
Las Vegas, Nev.

... After reading the September issue, I must say that Colonel Heinel has put forth an interesting and timely article.

Being 100 per cent in agreement, I believe he has come up with the best all-round solution to today's Summer Service A and B uniforms.

SSGT ROGER C. SOLHEID  
Milwaukee, Wisc.

... God Bless LtCol Heinel!

Never have I found myself more completely aligned with him than in his *Sensible Summer Uniform*. Much has been written about this highly controversial subject but never have the factors been so clearly outlined and dispassionately weighed.

... As one who hangs up *limp, stained khaki* after a long, hot summer, I am more than ready to listen to reason.

My shears are at the ready. Let the Quartermaster General but give the word and my khakis will very shortly conform to the Colonel's new summer service B.

Here's to air-conditioned knees, zephyr-cooled elbows and an unwilling military appearance.

CAPTAIN WALT SWINDELLS  
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

... I agree with LtCol R. D. Heinel, Jr., in that we have come a long way from the uniforms worn at the turn of the century. But when Marines start wearing play suits it's time to go to the showers.

A Marine is a man, and if you are going to be a man you have to look like one.

LTCOL LLOYD O. WILLIAMS  
Quantico, Va.

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**PRACTICAL REPLY:**



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
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... In the article Col Heintl recommended that the *bush jacket* be adopted as a *distinctive* item of Marine Corps summer apparel. Little did he know when he wrote the article that on page 63 of the same issue which printed his article would appear a picture of an Air Force officer wearing a *distinctive* Air Force bush jacket. Ergo, no distinctive Marine Corps khaki bush jacket.

The second point of conjecture. Repeatedly used as argument for cotton khaki uniforms is the comparative cheap laundering costs. Out here in Texas, I find that to present a smart military appearance it is necessary to change cotton khaki at least once a day. That requires a laundry tab of \$1.70 per week. By wearing tropical worsteds I have been able to wear the same wrinkle resistant uniform for at least four days. Dry cleaning tropical worsteds cost me \$1.20 a week—a savings of \$2.00 a month.

My recommendation for a summer uniform is to have a short-sleeved shirt made of a nylon- or dacron-type material (wrinkle-proof as possible), long trousers (whoever saw military-looking knees), with conventional head and foot gear. Make the color a light green.

MAJ G. R. LAPLANT

Fort Bliss, Texas

... Although I find several objectionable passages, I concur with the recommendations.

I take exception to some parts of the article, though. For example, ... *the seagoing combination of dress trousers, white cap and khaki shirt* ... stateside, at least, is a restricted uniform. However, there is no disputing the need for distinction in our summer wear.

It distressed me to note, throughout the article, disparaging allusions to enlisted men, painting an untrue picture. The *average* enlisted man of my acquaintance is at least as proud of his uniform, and as sharp, as his officers, hot weather or cold. To say—or even imply—that an enlisted man is the first to wilt and submit to the elements—to give the impression that all his starch is in his shirt—is unrealistic.

To return to the basic theme—reasonable raiment—let's hope that the Permanent Uniform Board takes a kindly view of the comfort problem.

SGT B. F. HARKANSON

Philadelphia, Pa.

... With all due respect to the author, OH, NO!

Who ever wore a pair of knee-length socks who wasn't constantly tugging at them to keep them up, or who didn't suffer from poor circulation because his elastic garters were tight enough to

hold them at knee level?

A short-sleeved, open collar, tropical worsted shirt for garrison-type duty would be *tops*. At least I'll concede a couple of points.

SGT DON M. ROBINSON

Camp Pendleton, Calif.

... *Sensible Summer Uniforms* has such a multitude of good points it would take reams of paper to make the favorable comments it rates. However, there will probably be adverse comment by men of the Corps who have helped put *shingles on Tun Tavern*, but heaven help some of them who are so robust they might be ashamed of their appearance because they certainly do not present any better appearance in the present uniforms. We have suffered the misery of tropical worsteds long enough and khaki, though cool enough, maintains its military appearance only long enough to leave the barracks and join a formation. Shortly thereafter, the best of them look like they have returned from a working party.

The year is 1955—not '02. Exploit the possibility of this new look and let's be comfortable just once in the Marine Corps.

TSGT EDMUND P. FERLAS

Camp Pendleton, Calif.

... I would like to add a loud *amen* to LtCol Heintl's thoughts with a few exceptions.

My husband is here in Pensacola on a tour of duty as an instructor in the Naval Air Training Command and we have been here a year. While the heat doesn't particularly bother me (I'm a native of Florida) I've seen my husband and some of his friends literally wilt from the heat and their uniforms react in the same way. This summer we've watched some of the naval officers come forth in the Navy-issue shorts and short-sleeved shirts. I'm sure they're cooler but their appearance hasn't improved very much.

I'm very much in favor of shorts for summer wear for Marines but I would like to urge that when they're designed, the design of the Navy shorts be completely thrown out. They're much too baggy and blousy and completely unmilitary looking. On the contrary, the Bermuda shorts being sold in most of the men's stores around the country are very smart and neat looking and seem to fit the wearer well.

I would urge too that the short-sleeved shirt be allowed for summer liberty wear rather than either of the two type blouses Col Heintl suggested as it would be cooler and more comfortable without losing too much military smartness. However, if one or the other of

the blouses is necessary then I believe the standing collar blouse would be preferable in that it's much smarter looking and also traditional to the Marine Corps. The bush jacket blouse just doesn't look too good without a shirt and tie underneath.

It would certainly seem that the move to short-sleeved shirts and shorts would save the Corps a lot of money and its men a lot of uncomfortable days. In these days when civilian clothes have followed the trend toward more comfort for the wearer, the Marine Corps should not be left behind.

MRS G. A. PHILLIPS HAYNES

Pensacola, Fla.

P.S. My husband has just read my letter and highly disapproves of my alternate to the summer liberty uniform being the standing collar blouse. He says it's much too hot and doesn't stand after a few hours of being worn.

... My gripe is this: there are entirely too many changes in uniforms of the Corps. We should keep the greens as they are, go back to the Sam Browne Belt and Campaign Hat and then fight any change to the death.

A uniform is tied in with tradition. A liberty uniform and one to be worn on ceremonial occasion and on guard duty should reflect the unchanging valor and devotion of the Corps. Why change this type of uniform? Yes, change weapons, battle-and-work-dress, but let's go back to khaki with no back pockets, shirts without emblems on the collar and throw that tie-clasp away!

How often do the "Guard Regiments" change their uniform? When you mess around with a uniform, you are upsetting the tradition that it represents.

Changing a Marine's uniform is like changing the design of *Old Glory*. No wonder a lot of folks have trouble recognizing a Marine. We had a good uniform—let's get it back and then stick with it!

CPL KIT C. RUSSELL

Flint, Mich.

### **Vicious Vendors**

... *Don't Kill 'Em With Kindness*. Sounds good b-b-but. Personnel can't be conditioned if the body is not receiving the proper food, and the mind, proper training. Nowadays it's difficult to muster personnel for a chow formation, march 'em to a messhall and have 'em eat properly. Can't blame the individuals too much because it's difficult to get past the barricades of candy, coke, cooky machines and doughnut vendors.

Married personnel seem to have similar troubles. The wife won't get up in the morning and has the husband convinced that he is not hungry and

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
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doesn't need breakfast. So when he arrives at work, instead of turning to, he's seeking doughnuts and coffee. The vendors in recent years are even coming out to rifle ranges. How can an individual fire a decent score if the doughnut vendor is late?

Vending machines are always a temptation to certain individuals. A high percentage of court-martials are due to personnel breaking vending machines, stealing money and contents. And a larger percentage are not caught.

The police and sanitation problem due to vending machines is terrific. My recommendation is get rid of all vending machines and vendors. Of course the PX officer will scream to high heaven. But I say that the Marine Corps has a mission other than supporting vendors. And if someone mentions *What about morale?* I say, to Hell with that vicious word which has been overworked by deadbeats and malcontents since the day that politicians and mothers have just about taken over the service.

MAJ WALTER SMULSKI

29 Palms, Calif.

## V-5

... TSgt Don Kelly in his article *Let 'Em Shoot* (August 1955), has hit the nail right on the head. Our present-day Marines are not getting sufficient opportunity to fire their rifles; therefore, they aren't learning how to hit the target.

For example, when I assumed command of this detachment I was appalled and astonished when I checked service record books and noted the recent M-1 qualification scores. Of the 39 men in this detachment, 8 per cent are experts, 15 per cent sharpshooters, 51 per cent marksmen, and 26 per cent unqualified. When such a large percentage of unsatisfactory results is obtained, the fault lies not with the individuals but with their training.

Whether the error lies in inadequate instruction or insufficient shooting allowances, I do not know; but they definitely need more shooting. They can only learn by doing.

And so, to TSgt Kelly's proposition, I lend my wholehearted support. Let 'em shoot!

CAPT NORMAN W. HICKS

USS Baltimore (CA-68)

... Kudos to TSgt Kelly. However, he did not mention the lack of Marine Corps rifle ranges in areas of the nation that do not have large Marine bases. Nor did he cite the potential boost this has for the Organized Reserve program. Last June, Jersey City's 14th and Port Newark's 24th SplInfCos and 5th Truck Co went to one of the Army's Fort Dix.

NJ, rifle ranges for a Sunday shoot. With summer camp one month away this paid drill was invaluable since a majority of the newly enlisted reservists had never before fired a .30 cal. rifle.

Reserve snapping-in time and B Course firing time at summer camp are apt to be severely limited because of a crowded training schedule. Therefore, why not organize volunteer firing parties from both Marine Barracks, I&I staffs, and all Reserve units in their area who are not near a Marine rifle range? As soon as enough men signed up and paid for a Saturday's or Sunday's shooting, the senior officer in the area could make arrangements to use the range of any nearby Army or National Guard post. This would 1) give the Reserve a chance to practice the A Course which he does not ordinarily fire, 2) provide a seasoning of regulars familiar with range procedures, and 3) stimulate local rifle teams to improve service and NRA firing by actual and mail competition. Otherwise run the range as TSgt Kelly suggested.

Don't let the idea die. Why not work out the cost per man and then have unit Special Services Officers poll each man in their units to determine how many would commit themselves. None of the other services has a setup like this. Why can't we be the first?

SGT WARREN I. PAUL

Nutley, NJ

... Having had part in the formation of a prototype marksmanship Volunteer Training Unit 5-12 for enlisted reserves (re: *The Reserve Marine*, August 1955 No. 8-55) and seen the success of such a unit, your article *Let 'Em Shoot* (August 1955) has living proof for such an approach to better shooting.

Only by constant shooting can a Marine be a good shot and develop a competitive shooting spirit. The marksmanship VTUs are doing this without pay on the Marine's own time by allowing him 1,800 rounds of ammunition a year and a chance to shoot each week. Under such conditions men have become better shots in several weeks than they were after several years under the restrictive shooting arrangements they had while on active duty.

The Corps may benefit by watching closely the results of the new marksmanship VTUs to see if the regular establishment could profit by such an approach.

CAPT B. C. RICH

Baltimore, Md.

Ed: See In Brief, p. 53.

## It's Not the Rank

... Being a Marine officer is a privilege of which any man can be proud! ... Although not an ex-enlisted man, in

the sense implied by Lieutenant Olds (Sept Message Center), I will agree that perhaps an officer who initially enlisted in the regular Marine Corps with no idea of obtaining a commission, may feel more proud of his achievements than the officer who has no regular enlisted service. However, this is the extent of my agreement with Lt Olds.

An officer who has served as a regular enlisted man might well bring to the officer corps the benefit of his experience, but beyond that he should divorce himself from his enlisted service. People know, or find out, whether or not an officer was a regular enlisted man through the medium of normal social intercourse.

Marines of all ranks usually are more interested in an officer's present capability and performance than his past record. Previous regular enlisted service does not automatically guarantee any standard of current performance.

Further, considering the great hue-and-cry recently about too many ribbons that carry little or no significance, or are awarded just because the person *was there*, I feel that the ribbon proposed by Lieutenant Olds falls into the category of ribbons that might well be eliminated. There are satisfactions and goals so much more important to achieve than ribbons: i.e., the recognition by and respect of fellow officers and enlisted men earned by an officer's performance.

One of the most important facets of this problem is that such an emphasis on the distinction between officers with and without prior regular enlisted service might possibly cause a cleavage in the officer corps. Such existed when greater emphasis was placed on the distinction between officers of the regular establishment and those of reserve components. It is unlikely that this feature would be considered desirable or adding to the cohesiveness of the Corps.

Pertinent comments above apply to the case of the enlisted man temporarily promoted to officer rank and later reverted to his former enlisted status.


1stLt T. C. BUDD, II

Quantico, Va.

## Check Point

... The opinion expressed by Sergeant Thomas A. Roberts, Jr., in *Message Center* September 1955 issue, fails to note that the guidon, by Company Drill Regulations, Landing Party Manual, 1927 Chapter 3, is located to the right of the Company Commander at all times when the company is in line or column.

CAPT ROBERT N. BURHANS  
MB, Washington, DC



## Carrier Based Jets to have Radar Guided Missiles

AIR-TO-AIR SPARROW 1 IN PRODUCTION FOR NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

### THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY:

■ Last year, newspapers from coast to coast carried headlines like the ones above, announcing the Navy's newest weapon of defense—Sparrow I—and the beginning of volume production for operational use in the fleets.

■ Ahead of these headlines were 7 years of intensive cooperative effort shared by the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics and Sperry.

■ Originally designated project HOT SHOT, Sparrow began back in 1947 when the Bureau of Aeronautics assigned to Sperry the full responsibility of creating an entirely new air-to-air missile system. It had to be light and compact — so multiple units could be carried by fighter-type jets. It had to be deadly accurate — capable of outmaneuvering the swiftest bombers an enemy could produce. And it had to be practical—suitable for large-scale production.

■ The rocket-powered, radar-guided Sparrow I, coming off the production lines here and at the new Sperry Farragut plant in Bristol, Tennessee, meets these requirements—and more. It embodies the proved features of more than 100 different missiles designed, constructed and tested during a 7-year period — and the finest brains of an organization that has devoted more than 40 years creating and manufacturing automatic flight control and fire control systems.

**SPERRY**

**GYROSCOPE COMPANY**  
Great Neck, New York

DIVISION OF SPERRY RAND CORPORATION




**FLIGHT TESTING THE ANTI-SUB HSS**—At Patuxent River, Maryland, the Navy has subjected the HSS helicopter to carefully-instrumented, grueling tests. This submarine-hunter is one version of the high-performance

Sikorsky S-58. It uses electronic sonar gear to locate and track subs. Addition of arming racks enables it to launch torpedoes or mines. The S-58 has twice the payload capacity of the S-55. Rotor blades fold back for shipboard use.

## AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



**FOR VENEZUELA**—A new Sikorsky S-55 type helicopter, pictured above, has been delivered to the Venezuelan Air Force. With the delivery, Venezuela joined the ranks of 14 nations whose armed forces or commercial air operators rely upon the efficiency and dependability of versatile Sikorsky helicopters. Pilots were trained in the S-55 at Sikorsky's Bridgeport plant.



**FOR THAILAND**—A representative of United Aircraft Service Corporation supervises the assembly of Sikorsky S-55 type helicopters in Bangkok. The machines will be flown by the Royal Thailand Air Force, on low-level border patrol duty. Six of the big Sikorsky helicopters were ordered. The type has achieved an outstanding record operating in jungles and other remote areas.



## HELICOPTER HISTORY



### FIRST HELICOPTER AIR-SEA RESCUE

In November, 1945—almost ten years before the recent flood disaster in which Sikorsky helicopters saved hundreds of people—a Sikorsky R-5 made what is believed to be the first helicopter rescue. Crewmen were brought safely ashore from a storm-swept barge wrecked on Penfield reef, off Fairfield, Connecticut.

**HELP FROM THE SKY**—When flash floods hit the northeastern states in late August, helicopters picked up nearly a thousand people and carried them to safety. People were rescued from houses being torn to pieces by savage flood waters, from hilltops, and from stranded trains and cars. In Connecticut alone, more than 500 were saved by Sikorsky helicopters. Above, a USAF Air Rescue Service Sikorsky H-19, pictured in Pennsylvania, lifts a woman to safety as a man waits his turn at a second floor window. Helicopters were often the only means of rushing food, medicine, and rescue workers to the stricken areas.



## SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT

One of the Divisions of United Aircraft Corporation

# introducing

IN THE KAISER REICH OF 1887 THERE was no doubt about **Erich von Manstein's** future—he was born of a family whose service as officers in the Prussian army dated back for generations. After beginning his formal military education in the Prussian military school system he was appointed a page at the Imperial Court in 1905. Then in 1906 he went to serve his apprenticeship as an ensign with the 3d Prussian Guards Regt. He was commissioned a lieutenant the next year and attended the war college just prior to the outbreak of WWI.

His personal history in WWI reads like a military history of the period. In 1914 alone, he moved from Belgium in August to East Prussia in September, and to southern Poland in October where he was severely wounded. He was back in action again the next year on the Eastern Front for the offensive in northern Poland and the defeat of Serbia. In 1916 he was back on the Western Front for the bloody battles at Verdun and on the Somme and on defense in Champagne (French Nivelle offensive). In 1917 he was a staff officer with the 4th CavDiv in the northeastern Baltic area and then went back west to the Vosges. The last year of the war he took part in the spring and summer drives on the Western Front and then went on the defensive until the war ended. For his services he was awarded the Iron Cross 1st and 2d class and the Knight's Cross of the House of Hohenzollern with Swords.

Interim years were spent in various staff and troop billets until 1934 when he was given a series of high-level staff assignments which carried him to the most important staff assignment on the General Staff—*Oberquartiermeister I* (operations).

By August 1939, von Manstein had risen to the rank of lieutenant general and was Chief of the General Staff (the equivalent to being second in command) for von Rundstedt's Army Group South in the Polish campaign. He continued in this assignment when that army group was shifted to the west and redesignated Army Group A. It was at this time (the



FIELDMARSHAL  
VON MANSTEIN

period covered in his article) that he pressed his views so vigorously and fought to correct errors that had been made in planning the coming offensive. His aggressiveness resulted in his being posted to command of the XXXVIII Corps, which he led to victory in the French campaign.

He shifted to the Eastern Front in 1941 and, as CG of the LVI PzKorps, he spearheaded the northern thrust of the Wehrmacht toward Leningrad. In September he took command of the Second Army when it was shifted from the Leningrad front. In the south, this army seized the Kerch peninsula, the Crimea and the fortress of Sevastapol bagging some 260,000 prisoners. In recognition of this feat he was promoted to Fieldmarshal. Then in November 1942 he was sent as a trouble-shooter to command the Don Army Group after the Sixth Army was cut off at Stalingrad. He was engaged in numerous defensive battles during the winter of 1942 as the massive Soviet offensive tried to entrap the entire German southern salient.

In 1943 he masterminded the "Citadel" operation which was ordered halted by Hitler after initial successes. It was during this time that the impending conflict between Hitler and the senior German field commanders over the conduct of the defense in Russia came to a head. Von Manstein persisted in presenting his views for the logical conduct of operations and decried the strategy that had led to one German unit after another being encircled by the Soviets. His vigorous objections led to his being ordered into retirement in April 1944.

In his soldierly career he earned his nation's highest awards for his service as a troop leader, planner and a fighting man (i.e. 2 Iron Crosses and 3 Knight's Crosses). And, also in other countries, he was well known as a soldier and a gentleman. This was especially true in England where a popular subscription was raised to provide him with private British counsel when he was being tried as a war criminal. Among his staunch supporters in this hour was Sir Winston Churchill, who had occasion to know the Fieldmarshal's handiwork well in 1940.

Fieldmarshal von Manstein's professional military essay *German Operations Planning for the Campaign in the West*, 1940 may be found on page 42. In it, he portrays some of the little-known indecisiveness which accompanied German military planning during the early stages of WWII. In a future issue, we hope to present another article by the Fieldmarshal on the conduct of the defense against a Soviet offensive.

In studying the essay, readers are cautioned not to be confused by the

abundant use of the word "operations" in the text. It is a direct result of the German military lexicon which divides the activities of field units into *tactics* (small units up to regimental size), *operations* (activities and movements of units up to army group size) and *strategy* (which has the same meaning as in the US).

Professor W. H. Russell was graduated from Haverford College and did two years graduate work in history at Harvard. Before WWII he taught for several years and then worked as editor and business manager for a firm that published weekly newspapers.

He entered the Naval Reserve early in 1942, serving throughout the war as personnel officer in schools operated by BuAer. Since 1946, Mr Russell has been a civilian member of the Department of English, History and Government at the US Naval Academy. The five articles in this series are based on research pursued during summer vacations since 1947. Part V, *The Genesis of FMF Doctrine*, is found on page 14.



PROF RUSSELL

Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Batterton offers GAZETTE readers another of his thought-provoking articles, *Random Notes on Korea*, on page 28. After entering the Corps from the University of Kentucky and completing Basic School at Philadelphia in 1941, LtCol Batterton was sent to England where he was a company officer in the Embassy Detachment. He was later assigned as Officer-in-Charge of the Marine training detachment with the British Commandos. In 1942 he was assigned to the 4th Raider Bn at Camp Pendleton and was with the outfit overseas. School and regular duties followed until 1952 when he joined the 1st Marines in Korea. He also served as Senior Advisor, Korean Marine Corps Schools. He was awarded a Silver Star and 2 Purple Hearts during WWII and received his second Silver Star and a Bronze Star for action in Korea. During the early part of 1955 the Army awarded him 2 Bronze Stars for the New Georgia Operation (WW II) while serving with the 4th Raiders. He is currently ExO, MB, 8th and Eye, Washington, DC.



LTCOL BATTERTON

THE AUGUST ISSUE OF THE GAZETTE contained Maj Richard A. Hunt's *The Helicopter—an Airplane not a 6 x 6* and this issue Maj John D. Case answers with *A Rebuttal, The Helicopter, Replacement for the Army Mule* (page 24). Commissioned in 1943, Maj Case spent 13 months as an enlisted man instructing in smallarms. During WWII he served as CO, MD, USS *Charleston* and from 1946 to 1949 he was a rifle company commander with the 2d MarDiv. After completing the Naval Gunfire Course at MCS, he served over 2 years as Shore Bombardment Officer with PhibGruFour. In 1952 he took over as ExO, 3d Bn, 9th Marines, 3d MarDiv. And in Japan he engaged in extensive helicopter maneuvers. Then after serving with the 5th Marines in Korea, he was assigned to his present duties as instructor, Tactics Section, Junior School, Quantico.



MAJ CASE

ANOTHER NEW IDEA FOR AVIATION comes from the pen of LtCol Robert F. Steinkraus, *An Air Proficiency Trophy* (page 37). Col Steinkraus will be remembered by GAZETTE readers for his *Rotate the Squadron* (GAZETTE, Jan. 55).

CURATOR OF THE MARINE CORPS, as well as of the Marine Corps Museum at Quantico, author and artist are just a few of the jobs handled by LtCol John H. Magruder, III. He offers GAZETTE readers another article on little known subject, *The Brevet in the Marine Corps* (page 54). LtCol Magruder is presently planning a Marine Corps museum worthy of the name. Current plans call for the completion of the museum, in early 1957, at Marine Corps Schools on a par with the museums at West Point and Annapolis. He was sailing on a junk in the Far East when WWII broke out in Europe. He joined British forces in the Middle East and after the attack on Pearl Harbor came home to a commission in the Marine Corps. He was with the 2d MarDiv from its activation through Saipan and Tinian. From 1944 to the end of the war, he served on the staff of SHAEF as British Royal Navy liaison officer to Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group for the river crossings in the Low Countries. He was released to inactive duty after WWII but was recalled in 1952 and assigned to Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC to set up a Marine exhibit at the Smithsonian Institute and to carry out his present assignment.

# PROSPECTUS

**OBJECTIVE** — To disseminate knowledge of the Military art and science and to propagate such thought throughout the Corps for the continuing improvement of doctrines and technique. To this end the Marine Corps GAZETTE was established as the journal of the Association to be the platform for the free and unhindered exchange of professional ideas among its members. To carry out this objective, John A. Lejeune enjoined the Association's first members to submit their ideas, plans and concepts to the GAZETTE in written form for the enlightenment of other members.

**EXECUTION** — Within the limits of editorial material on hand, the editors attempt to present a balanced issue containing articles of interest to aviation and ground officers. The ideal issue should cover administration, tactics on high and low levels, articles on contemporary thought as well as history and controversial pieces that should stimulate thought and professional rebuttal and debate.

**DISCUSSION** — At the present time there seems to have developed a certain reluctance on the part of members of our air arm to contribute extensively. Certainly there must be an NA or two with new concepts for Marine jet employment or those who would take up a discussion of the problems facing maximum co-operation between air and ground units.

**CONCLUSION** — The GAZETTE is your journal. It is only as good as contributing Members of the Association make it. The Association will consider any article of professional interest and the Editorial Board together with the Editor-in-Chief has been charged with the responsibility of approving material submitted for publication and establishing the rate of pay for the articles accepted. This rate of pay runs from 3 to 6 cents a word. The manuscript is used to compute payment — not the printed page. Manuscripts are acknowledged upon receipt and the author is notified of the decision of the board as soon thereafter as possible.


## AUTHOR'S FORMAT

- 1—Type, double-space all manuscripts on standard or legal-size paper. Leave at least 1-inch margin all around.
- 2—In order to expedite the passage of the manuscript through the Board it is requested that 3 copies be submitted.
- 3—Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editorial Office, Marine Corps Gazette, MCS, Quantico, Va.

# GENESIS OF

# FMF

# DOCTRINE



By W. H. Russell

Now in its 180th year, the Corps' mission is based on a doctrine that evolved during the Advanced Base period—Marine Corps units should be integral with a fleet-centered amphibious force

## Part V—1900 to 1935

THOUGH THE FLEET MARINE Force structure is not yet 22 years old, attack from the sea was almost as familiar to Alexander, Caesar, Sir Walter Raleigh, or Sir John Moore as it became to thousands of Americans during WWII. Yet so different was the conventional approach to combat which moved from marginal sea to marginal land, that today's concept of a fleet-centered amphibious assault is scarcely older than the FMF.

From Alexander's siege of Tyre until the battle of Lepanto in 1571, standard procedure among Mediterranean amphibians called for attaching a fleet of galleys to a balanced ground force of all arms. Since a general exercised unified command of those combined arms, such a fleet acquired the status of a full-type command within an army. Amphibious doctrine based on fleets propelled by oars was army-centered. However, once seafaring burst out from the confines of the Mediterranean, command at sea became so specialized that after Raleigh's day few men attempted, during the age of sail, to handle both the sea and land components of an amphibious force. In consequence—amphibious command under sail came to be shared between a general and an admiral. The resulting amphibious doctrine produced what we now call "combined operations." Thus it remained for steam to create a fighting ship that evoked fleet-centered amphibious doctrine.

### Embryonic Amphibious Policy

IN VIEW OF the long history of amphibious attack against coastal positions, it is no coincidence that from the early 19th Century one can discern an amphibious cast to military policies of the United States. Though policymakers of that era rarely used the term *amphibious*, virtually all of their decisions about the composition or assignment of US armed forces reflected a preoccupa-

tion with defense against attack from the sea.

The reason is obvious: as long as Europe contained all of the world's major powers, and so long as they relied upon sail-driven ships for sea transport, simple logic affirmed that any defense which could deny American beachheads to European powers would insure the US against foreign invasion. Sailing ships could not lie safely off open beaches, neither could 19th Century technology create artificial harbors or improvise land transport in a country with few coastal roads. So any substantial amphibious force, of necessity, had to use an established port even though its determined defenders could build forts with guns capable of overpowering seaborne ordnance. Shortly after the War of 1812 joint boards of Army Engineers and senior Navy officers determined which of the US harbors a European aggressor might assail. Then for 30 years Army Engineer officers like Sylvanus Thayer and Robert E. Lee supervised the building of masonry forts designed to stop the sailing men-of-war on which a potential invader would have to depend. By 1850 these forts comprised the keystone of national defense and each element of the armed forces drew its mission from the need for supporting the key coastal positions.

Since any potential invader had to advance slowly across the Atlantic, the US did not require a large standing army during the age of sail. With regular units of coast artillery garrisoned in the coastal forts, a few skeletonized regiments of infantry, field artillery and dragoons sufficed to support the fortress garrisons until a volunteer militia might muster sufficient strength for throwing any hostile invader back into the sea. And in such circumstance the 19th Century sailing navy of the US had less need for large squadrons of capital ships than for numerous fast cruis-

## U. S. MARINES

"SOLDIERS OF THE SEA"



INTERESTING DUTY - BOTH LAND AND SEA

ers. During peace, these ships ranged the world trade routes to shepherd and protect commercial vessels flying the national ensign. In war, they were expected to perform functions like those traditionally fulfilled by cavalry engaged in large-scale land war. That is, the naval cruisers were to harass enemy supply lines by commerce raiding and to furnish coastal defenders with intelligence collected through aggressive reconnaissance.

Even as steam gradually replaced sail after 1850, national interest continued to dictate a US military policy aimed at thwarting amphibious invasion from Europe. But the advent of steam-driven warships, as well as the shock imposed by French invasion of Mexico during the 1860's, effected a gradual change in the means for carrying out the defensive policy. Experience gained during the American Civil War demonstrated that sailing ships with auxiliary steam power could neutralize the massive forts which had anchored American defenses through several decades. So for 30 years after 1861 the Navy gradually took over, from the Coast Artillerists, the role of frontline defender against Euro-

pean attack on the Western Hemisphere. This new role required the Navy to shift its reliance from fast cruisers to heavier gun platforms whose short endurance at sea limited them to coast defense. Yet that single change did not of itself provide adequate national security, for an invading force which seized an outlying island of the hemisphere might then use the new mobility conferred by steam to land hostile troops at almost any point on the American coast. Once ashore, that ground force could then exploit rapidly the new road and rail net the US had developed.

Steam-driven ships, then, had changed the situation. For in order to thwart a first-class steam fleet, US squadrons had to defeat it at the edge of the continental shelf before the enemy established an advanced base in American waters. Yet the 19th Century steam-driven vessels were so limited in combat range and endurance at sea that the defending fleet could not patrol offshore indefinitely unless it, too, possessed advanced bases off the American coast. Since cabled intelligence from over seas could afford a US fleet ample time to move into an intercepting position, this new emphasis upon advanced bases did not imply amphibious seizure of a base already in enemy hands. It involved merely occupying an empty area, adding coal dumps and repair facilities, and then defending the improvised base against possible attack. So the need for using still-experimental steam vessels to repel amphibious invasion from Europe required the infant steam navy to evolve embryonic amphibious techniques of its own in order to provide the advanced naval

bases upon which effective national defense had come to depend. And the first step toward fulfilling even this limited amphibious mission required the US to develop a force of naval infantry specially trained for amphibious work.

Shortly after 1880, alert Navy officers began to give this novel problem special attention. The fact that the Army still maintained a mere skeleton force in peacetime, coupled with the impossibility of predicting exactly where an offshore base must exist, converted the development of fleet infantry into a purely naval problem. For a decade many officers of the Navy experimented intensively with the kind of bluejacket landing force Britons had evolved during the age of sail. But as the new ships devoted more space to machinery and placed increasing demands on their seamen, it became gradually clear that no major naval squadron could send away an effective bluejacket landing force without impairing its own combat power. So in 1894, after a heated naval controversy, Congress stepped in and assigned to the Marine Corps the mission of providing fleet infantrymen who could establish advanced fleet bases. (For detailed treatment see "The Genesis of FMF Doctrine: 1879-1899," GAZETTE, Apr-Jul 1951.)

This Congressional decision provided a unique solution to one of steam's pressing problems. Though Britain's Royal Marines had been in existence for 200 years, they continued in the steam navy to perform the shipboard functions evolved for them under sail, and the Royal Navy continued to rely upon army forces whenever a large-scale landing impended. The French came to regard

their coast artillery units as a corps of sea soldiers, but this trend did not produce a true naval infantry large enough to effect significant landings. Germany and Japan made amphibious assault an army mission with striking early results but no full-scale development. Thus, the US stood alone among the world's naval powers in its creation of a type-force of naval infantry integral with the fleet. This move became the first significant step in evolving the US amphibious power adapted to 20th Century technology.

The 1894 decision came none too soon, for within 4 years the US steam navy faced its first major test against a European force in American waters. Techniques evolved between 1894 and 1898 produced the battalion of Fleet Marines which seized a base at Guantanamo Bay in 1898. By hanging grimly to its toehold in the face of numerically stronger opposition, that single battalion made RAdm William T. Sampson's blockaders a "fleet that came to stay." The lessons of Guantanamo reinforced by unhappy experience with the Filipino Insurrection, which would not have developed had RAdm George Dewey's Asiatic Squadron possessed an adequate complement of fleet infantry, confirmed the wisdom of the Congressional decision in 1894. So it was experience flowing from the Spanish-American War which set the stage for giving amphibious warfare an important role in the 20th Century military policy of the US.

#### Amphibious Foundations

By 1900 conditions affecting world power had changed drastically. Accelerating demands for raw materials and markets brought the European powers into competition



1894 — basic amphibious techniques were developed



**1898—Guantanamo seized; techniques proven**

for Asiatic resources and enhanced their conflict of interest with Japan. Meanwhile the US had emerged as a world power whose economic and technological strength virtually insured America against invasion from Europe. Yet as her industries swallowed increasing quantities of raw materials and required ever-larger foreign markets, the US too focused upon east Asian resources. Japan's obvious distaste for American intrusion into her part of the world created the need for a new US military policy aimed at protecting the expanded national interest.

Thus, though neither national interest nor policy would condone aggressive measures in east Asia, both domestic and world conditions had by 1900 extended the outer limits of American defenses to Asia's marginal sea. This drastic extension of the strategic boundary for US defensive action created a serious problem for the Navy. Almost before it had succeeded in creating a force to protect hemispheric waters, the sea service had to develop a fleet capable of defending the Philippines, 6,000 miles across the Pacific. This dramatic new mission confronted the Navy with a novel problem, for her ships possessed such limited endurance at sea that merely moving a squadron to the Far East required a chain of new fleet bases advancing across the Pacific from Hawaii to the Philippines. So, though the temper of the people was overwhelmingly peaceful, the Navy found itself required to control islands in the Far Pacific which could provide the advanced bases it needed for defending the national interest. It sought a chain of bases close enough together to support the existing ships, as well as a component of reinforced fleet infantry for defending the new bases.

In almost every year of the new

century's first decade, US Marine Corps units based at the Philippines or Guam served as fleet infantry under direct control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet. They saw active service near Manila, in the Leyte area, on Samoa and during the Boxer Rebellion in China. While serving ashore they constructed advanced-base defenses at Cavite and Olongapo in the Philippines. During those years a great deal of sound, trial-and-error experimentation hammered out fundamental command relationships essential for employing infantry as an element integral with the fleet. A well developed rotation policy afforded many Marine officers practical experience in co-operating with their opposite numbers in the Navy without surrendering their responsibilities as fleet infantrymen. While the Asiatic Fleet grappled with the immediate problem, other elements of the naval service strove to discover just what complement

and equipment an effective base force would require. The General Board, Office of Naval Intelligence, Naval War College, Marine Corps Headquarters and the North Atlantic Squadron all worked on the problem. As a result the Marine Corps was able to establish, by 1912, a permanent Advanced Base Force at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. It comprised an infantry regiment reinforced by artillery and service elements, all in a state of fire-department readiness for taking ship and moving to any area where an arm of the fleet should require a base. In the years from 1912 through 1916 this fleet type-force gained valuable experience in a series of Caribbean police missions requiring prompt naval action.

Thus, by 1912 new conditions of national power in the Pacific had induced the Navy to evolve from its experience the fundamental outlines of an amphibious policy adapted to 20th Century technology. Most significant among the developments of these years was the foundation for a type-force reinforced infantry integral with the fleet, and of an amphibious command doctrine through which the infantry could be used effectively. However, these twin developments provided only the foundation for future building because neither experience nor material had demonstrated, by 1912, the need for an amphibious assault force with ma-



**1912—a type-force, reinforced infantry with the fleet**

ture logistic support. In those early years of the 20th Century, Pacific islands were so little developed that establishing an advanced fleet base implied the mere pre-emption of an undefended island. In consequence, early Marine Corps advanced-base units fulfilled missions very similar to those performed during the 1940s by the Navy's Construction Battalions, and their few strictly tactical exercises looked more toward defense of bases occupied without bloodshed than to seizing bases by assault from the sea. This emphasis upon construction and defense delayed the emergence of a mature amphibious doctrine. Though Marine Corps quartermasters called sharp attention to the need for careful logistic planning, that problem won scant attention in the years before *amphibious* automatically implied assault. And for the same reasons advanced-base amphibians failed to develop special assault craft or to produce gunnery doctrines which adapted fleet ordnance to the role of supporting artillery.

However, the 16 years of hard work early in the century did produce significant results. The long

effort to defend advanced island bases prepared a whole generation of innovators for contriving just the sort of assault those early defenses had aimed to thwart. Also the command relationships and infantry type-force evolved by 1912 became the foundation upon which the naval services eventually built their successful amphibious forces.

#### **Amphibious Power Comes of Age**

AFTER 1912, steadily improving relations between the US and Japan, coupled with Europe's rapid drift toward the First World War, led American policymakers to shift their attention from the Pacific to the Atlantic. And even though Japan steadily consolidated her position between 1914 and 1918, the European war focused American military thinking upon the simpler forms of ground or sea combat which were uncomplicated by amphibious problems.

In 1917 and 1918 the Navy supplemented Britain's sea service and devoted its main effort to convoying men and equipment safely across the Atlantic. The AEF enjoyed a ready-made beachhead on the far shore.

Ports in friendly hands afforded base facilities and there was ample space to organize the landed troops for battle. Yet even in a European land war Marines used techniques that contributed to amphibious development, as well as to victory in Europe. Marines commanded by Brig Gen Smedley D. Butler (an Advanced Base veteran) converted the US area at Brest into an efficient forward base through which Army units moved smoothly toward the front. And in frontline combat, under many officers with Advanced Base experience, hundreds of Marines gained valuable experience at adapting the new 20th Century weapons to a pattern for offensive fire-and-movement.

When Japan's post-Armistice activity wrenched American military leaders away from their comfortable preoccupation with European affairs, Marine Corps combat experience in Europe provided the foundation for a new, Pacific-centered policy. Though it asserted itself slowly, the new capacity for successful infantry assault which had been discovered in France eventually became the keystone for amphibious assault during WWII.



**1918 — experience in adapting new weapons to a pattern for offensive fire and movement**

In 1919, however, attention focused on more immediate problems. By then Japan had extended her sphere of control into German-held islands of the Palau, Mariana and Marshall groups flanking any line by which a US fleet might advance to the Philippines. Backing these outposts with a truly modern fleet, Japan had become the major world power in East Asia. So even though American relations with Japan were more cordial than they had been earlier in the century, she had become the United States' potential enemy. Unfortunately, very few citizens recognized the impact of Japan's new position upon American policies. A wave of antiwar feeling hampered seriously the naval effort to develop forces for protecting the United States' expanding interest in East Asia. Yet this obstacle did not deter thoughtful military leaders from a series of unpopular steps without which their nation could not have been ready for WWII. And as soon as the First World War released their energies, various elements of the armed forces began steps toward providing the amphibious instrument American interests in the Pacific required so urgently.

Between 1919 and 1921 these steps took the form of staff studies by Army, Navy and Marine Corps agencies; lectures or group problems at various schools for officers; and numerous individual efforts reflected by articles published in professional magazines. From 1919 till 1925 the British amphibious doctrine (generally similar to that employed at Dardanelles-Gallipoli) dominated efforts to evolve an amphibious force for the US. But in the middle 1920s American amphibians rejected the British precedent and returned to their own concept for purely naval control of amphibious operations, which had evolved during the Advanced Base period. In 1933, this trend produced the Fleet Marine Force as a well-balanced type-force of reinforced naval infantry, integral with the fleet. And by 1934 the same trend also produced the fundamental body of amphibious doctrine used so effectively in WWII.

These various efforts proved so disjointed that few of the men involved perceived the goal of their own actions. Indeed only hindsight



*Ellis—a prophetic plan*

justifies presenting an orderly pattern built around the 4 steps just mentioned which: 1) conferred a new offensive power upon the amphibious infantryman; 2) accepted the US concept for purely naval control of amphibious operations; 3) created a well-balanced type-force of reinforced naval infantry, integral with the fleet; and 4) developed a body of amphibious doctrine adapted to 20th Century requirements. But however dimly they saw their goal, military leaders of the US did progress. By 1921, when occupation forces returned from Germany, they had already taken the preliminary steps toward evolving the new amphibious force.

In 1921 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy (early forerunner of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) issued a pamphlet outlining an amphibious doctrine based on British experience in combined army and navy operations. That same year the Navy organized a small fleet unit, called the Control Force, to revive the kind of small-scale amphibious exercises that had been conducted earlier in the century. Also, in 1921 the Navy Department reactivated at Quantico, Virginia, the old Advanced Base Force. Redesignated the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, it was considered an integral unit of the operating fleet. During the preceding year the Office of Naval Intelligence had published an extensive study of a projected trans-Pacific

campaign by US forces, including the MCEF. And by the end of 1921, both Navy and Marine Corps had developed war plans to implement the kind of operation reflected in the ONI booklet.

Yet even this promising start produced disappointing results. The joint Army and Navy board study served merely as a springboard for later work along quite different lines. Though the Control Force was well led, budgetary limitations restricted its immediate results to a series of problems studied at the Naval War College. A skimpy budget also hobbled the Expeditionary Force. It did, however, serve to focus attention upon a purely naval mission for the Marine Corps, and to provide tactical units for a few amphibious exercises. Indeed only the 1921 war plan exerted direct influence upon the Pacific war that a few long-sighted men even then foresaw.

This prophetic plan grew from the work of LtCol Earl H. Ellis, USMC, a pioneer amphibian of the Advanced Base period. It provided for seizing fleet bases stretching westward from Pearl Harbor or Samoa through which the US might project her naval power as far as the Philippines. The Ellis portfolio departed from earlier practice by recognizing that conquest of Pacific island bases would require offensive daylight action across well-defended beaches. Ellis insisted that no American force could operate in Asiatic waters without first wresting from Japanese control the bases it would need. Once such a fleet had fought its way to the threshold of Japan, Ellis foresaw 2 alternatives. Either purely naval forces might employ blockade to defeat Japan, or the Navy could conduct an Army expeditionary force to Japan and set the troops ashore for a climactic campaign.

Quite aside from its remarkably prophetic elements, the 1921 war portfolio had significant influence upon US amphibious development between the World Wars. Once adopted by the Naval services it became a blueprint for projected action across the Pacific, and so converted amphibious doctrine from an abstract theory into a practical instrument for solving an impending problem. In consequence, each successful effort toward implementing

this master naval plan became a link in the chain of developments that gradually forged the US amphibious force. Through its realistic insistence on daylight infantry assault supported by naval gunfire, the Ellis plan created the demand for an amphibious force as capable in its own field as were balanced Army units in conventional ground warfare. And by creating this demand, the Ellis plan began a chain reaction that finally produced beach assault teams capable of exploiting the new offensive power conferred on amphibious infantry. Yet few of Ellis' contemporaries grasped the implications of his war portfolio. Thought-patterns based on conventional experience died hard. Only slowly did a substantial group of Marines perceive that their Corps' future rested on its continual development as a force of naval infantry. But the few Marines who grasped the Ellis concept worked skillfully, and there slowly

ing staff planning. Like Ellis, Dunlap insisted that this force must be prepared in all respects for daylight landing under fire. And though few of the Dunlap concepts were new, his paper drew significance from its stress upon the fact that US forces might soon face conditions similar to those that had defeated the British at Dardanelles-Gallipoli. Thus by the force of its negative example, Dardanelles-Gallipoli began to supply a sense of urgency conspicuously lacking in amphibious development before 1921.

In 1922 and again in 1924 Navy and Marine Corps units conducted amphibious exercises at Culebra Island in the Caribbean, the site of similar tests during the Advanced Base period. In the 1924 exercise, Marines experimented with pontoon bridging equipment to create an artificial harbor like that the British had used at Gallipoli. Also, in 1924, there was a single armored am-



**Dunlap—a positive concept from a negative example**

phibious craft somewhat smaller than the Beetle boats Britons developed during their 1915 Aegean effort. Some Marines from Culebra joined fleet and Army units in similar exercises at the Canal Zone. Though the maneuver was crude, it demonstrated that resourceful and well-trained amphibians could penetrate conventional defenses. But the 1924 exercise marked the end of active participation in such maneuvers by the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force because its basic strength moved to China as part of a Marine force called there by threatening developments on the Asiatic mainland.

In 1925 Army and Navy officers took part in a combined amphibious exercise near Pearl Harbor. This maneuver tested the British-type amphibious concept supported by the



**1922, Culebra—a single armored amphibious craft**

developed in the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico a sense of the Corps' true mission.

In 1921 Col Robert H. Dunlap, USMC, closely associated with Ellis during the Advanced Base period, published an important analysis of the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign which laid down fundamental requirements for the infantry component of an amphibious fleet. Perhaps the most significant element of Dunlap's thesis lay in his insistence that fleet infantry comprise a balanced force of all arms, carefully trained in advance for the assault mission and supported by painstaking



**1924, China—the 3d Brig moved out; experimentation halted**

joint Army and Navy board and was the first American amphibious experiment to include significant elements of Army and Navy air strength. If it did nothing else, the 1925 exercise convinced key officers in all services that the US lacked an amphibious doctrine sufficiently effective for her armed force to carry out the basic Pacific war plan. Coming as it did on the heels of conditions that required the nation to dispatch the bulk of her Marine Corps to the Chinese mainland, this conclusion produced action.

Though there is no clear record of any formal decision, all significant US amphibious development after 1925 rejected the British "committee" trend in favor of the American concept which made amphibious development a naval mission. Also, in 1925, there emerged at the Naval War College a significant trend with important influence on amphibious development. As they studied problems based on the 1921 war portfolio, clear-sighted naval officers recognized that success depended on the ability to evolve planning and operational techniques which would support an island-hopping campaign. Such thinking coalesced about logistics which, as early as 1925 began to dominate Naval War College studies.

Intensive work on logistics at the War College and in Washington laid a sound foundation during the 16 years after 1925 for developing the techniques required to plan and support an amphibious campaign. As a result, small groups of naval officers grew increasingly concerned with detailed amphibious planning, convoy organization, launching the ship-to-shore movement and funneling supplies over the beach. Such work was invaluable, for it contributed in an important degree to the big-picture aspect of the mature amphibious operation. But specific details like troop organization, training, design of assault craft, combat-unit loading, or beach reconnaissance—as well as naval air or gunfire support, and maintaining a steady supply over combat beaches—all remained to be worked out. And it was in the latter fields that the Marine Corps (with substantial assistance from individual Navy officers) made the major contribution.

After 1925 the Marine officers who



*1927, Nicaragua—a dramatic demonstration of integral air support*

understood how intimately their Corps' future was tied to the Navy began to exert measurable influence. Curricula at Marine Corps Schools underwent steady revision which saw problems devoted to amphibious assault gradually replace the conventional problems in ground warfare borrowed from the Army's school at Fort Leavenworth. As a result, Marine Corps Schools emerged slowly as the seedbed for maturing 20th Century amphibious doctrine. At the same time officers rotating through the Corps Headquarters in Washington became increasingly aware that both naval services required a balanced type-force of reinforced infantry integral with the fleet. But just as the Marine Corps Schools and Headquarters began moving toward a solution, trouble broke out in Nicaragua during 1927 that absorbed virtually all the Corps' Stateside energy for several years.

Yet even this interruption contributed to amphibious development, for the antiguerrilla operations in Nicaragua focused attention upon small-unit infantry tactics. Consequently it provided an opportunity for bringing up to date the fire-and-movement techniques evolved in 1918. Nicaraguan experience with small patrols, armed with rifles, BARs and grenades, passed on to postwar Ma-

rines a conviction that small, efficient combat teams lay at the root of successful infantry assault. From just such teams as those evolved in Nicaragua, the Corps built its amphibious assault forces in WWII.

Nicaraguan experience also taught Marines the value of close co-operation between air and ground elements of the same force. Since wiping out elusive guerrillas required the ground force to operate in widely scattered units, small Marine patrols faced severe handicaps. Repeatedly, reconnaissance planes discovered guerrillas lying in ambush and warned ground patrols. Frequently aerial bombing and strafing helped ground units to drive off numerically superior guerrilla forces. Time and again aggressive pilots demonstrated the value of air supply and air evacuation of wounded. Though none of these incidents was part of a pre-planned co-operative effort, they demonstrated in dramatic fashion the kinds of assistance integrated air support could confer upon combat infantry. The growing conviction that close-support airmen were merely "infantrymen bearing other arms" opened a whole new field for aircraft in time of war. Specific Nicaraguan lessons in air-to-ground communication, close-support bombing and strafing, as well

as in aerial supply or evacuation of wounded, all contributed measurably to the later elaboration of these techniques during WWII.

By 1930, as China and Nicaragua gradually released Marines in substantial numbers, the various threads of amphibious development began to assume a recognizable pattern. Interest at MCS in evolving doctrine, Marine Headquarters' approach to a type-force of fleet infantry and Naval College's concern for a base-complex to support the combat fleet, all began to complement each other so effectively that within 4 years after 1930 the US capped its slow amphibious evolution by creating the first American force geared for full-scale amphibious assault.

In the academic year 1930-31 MCS completed its break with a ground warfare preoccupation dating back to 1917. Late in that year a naval gunfire problem based on British experience at Dardanelles-Gallipoli drew fresh attention to the example Col Dunlap had used to emphasize the need for an American amphibious doctrine. And at the same time, informal co-operation with the Naval War College produced a well-rounded problem in amphibious assault. These steps induced the Commandant, MCS to release 4 officers from teaching duties so that they might prepare a *Text for Landing Operations*. Maj Charles D. Barrett (chairman), Maj L. H. Miller Maj Pedro del Valle (all USMC), and Lieutenant Walter C. Ansel USN comprised this committee. Relying heavily on tests at Quantico with experimental landing craft, as well as experimental loading of a transport, this Barrett Committee prepared the working draft of an amphibious manual. Though never published, this work provided a foundation for the amphibious manual published 2 years later.

While the Barrett Committee labored over its amphibious manual, the entire staff and student body at MCS devoted the academic year 1932-33 to amphibious studies. Divided into committees which functioned like the sections of an operational staff, they analyzed in detail the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign. Then the group devoted its full attention to the first formal Advanced Base Problem to be studied jointly

by the Naval War College and Marine Corps Schools. This exercise followed closely the then-current plan for a possible Pacific war—a direct development from the 1921 Ellis war portfolio. And it aimed specifically at providing evidence from which naval planners could devise the structural details of an effective infantry type-force for the fleet.

Though work proceeded concurrently on the amphibious manual and the force to implement it, the latter project matured first. Early in August 1933 MajGen John H. Russell, Jr. (at the time Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and a pioneer amphibian of the Advanced Base period) began working with the CNO upon procedures for creating the FMF. And on 8 December the Secretary of the Navy issued an order activating the FMF as a fleet unit. So for the first time in its history the US Navy afforded an integral type-force of reinforced infantry dedicated to amphibious assault missions, and *assault* was the key concept which set this unit apart. For though the Marine Corps had always advocated aggressive performance of all missions, never before had it enjoyed for any protracted period specific designation as the fleet's front line assault element. Yet, important as was the mere existence of such a Fleet Marine Force, it did not convert the US fleet into a force capable of establishing bases across the Pacific. The new FMF needed a basic doctrine to guide its training as an arm of the fleet, and all other fleet elements to be involved in amphibious assault needed to perfect a myriad of techniques. So it was fortunate that doctrinal work at the MCS had paralleled efforts in Washington to create the new FMF.

General Russell knew of the Barrett Committee and its work toward an amphibious manual. In November 1933, shortly after receiving an urgent request from the fleet, Russell directed both staff and students of MCS to produce a manual which would spell out details of amphibious planning and execution. Under Maj Barrett's chairmanship and working closely with staff officers of the fleet, the Quantico group produced the first US manual to present a mature amphibious doctrine late in 1934. Published as the *Tenta-*

*tive Manual for Landing Operations*, the new work underwent slight modification till 1938 when the Navy adopted it as *Fleet Training Publication 167*. In 1941 the Army issued virtually the same text as a field manual. These 2 publications remained the basic guides for both planning and training that produced all US amphibious operations during WWII. Though experience in the early 1940s constantly refined the techniques of amphibious assault, the basic 1934 doctrine withstood its prolonged trial by fire without significant change.

By 1934, then, the US had evolved the fundamental elements of a fleet-centered amphibious force. She possessed either the necessary heavy ships or detailed plans for building them as soon as funds became available. Also she had a balanced type-force of reinforced fleet infantry and the basic doctrine for employing it as the frontline element of amphibious assault. And though there remained the massive job of evolving the myriad subsidiary techniques to weld these fundamental elements into an effective combat team, WWII demonstrated that the doctrinal foundation was solid.

Thus a nation whose security from the beginning had focused attention upon the amphibious problem, finally learned by gradual evolution the means of resolving that problem. And though one might regret the protracted concern for defense against amphibious attack, it contributed materially to the ultimate solution. For it was during the Advanced Base period that amphibians evolved the concept of Marine Corps units integral with the fleet, and pioneered the doctrine for unified command of a fleet-centered amphibious force. And in the same period Marine and Navy officers hammered out the intricate details implicit in the coexistence of infantryman and sailor in a modern fleet.

Indeed, the basic faith in an amphibious ideal which men like Dunlap, Ellis and Russell developed in their formative years became the catalyst that permitted the succeeding generation to create the FMF and its fleet-centered doctrine. A combination that has made *co-ordinated* and *assault* the twin keys to amphibious success. USMC

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# A REBUTTAL . . . . .

## The Helicopter—a replacement for the Army Mule



By Maj J. D. Case

IN THE AUGUST ISSUE OF THE GAZETTE, Maj Hunt's article on the helicopter makes the point that the helicopter must not be regarded as an evolutionary successor to the horse or amphibious landing craft, but rather must be regarded and treated as an aircraft. This point is one made frequently by aviators when discussing the helicopter with ground officers and is supposed to immediately silence all comment by ground officers on helicopter employment.

Actually, we ground officers are aware that the helicopter must be considered as an aircraft, but we also are aware that it is a means of transportation and is not a combatant-type aircraft. There are actually similarities between the helicopter, the horse, the amphibious landing craft and the 6x6 truck. As a matter

of fact, the helicopter is very much like a mule.

For years the Army mule was considered the most dependable form of transportation over all types of terrain. The mule could go wherever a man could and the mule wanted to go! With the advent of the helicopter, it appeared to many a ground officer that we now had a suitable replacement for the Army mule. However, restrictions on control of the helicopter as established, in Maj Hunt's article would take away much of the helicopter's versatility and, under the system of control he so vehemently champions, we may end up with a "mule" that does not want to go where the man does.

Fortunately all is not as black as would first appear. Despite the comment that there "should be no ques-

tion or indecision concerning control of rotor-driven aircraft," there is, in the minds of many of us, such question and indecision. It is advanced almost as dogma in some Marine Corps circles that we must not consider changes in our present air control system because this system worked so well in WWII and Korea. It seems to me that this insistence on the control of helicopters being conducted in the same manner as the control of tactical aircraft is being pushed by many aviators as a matter of dogma simply because:

a) The helicopter is an aircraft.  
b) We control other aircraft in a certain way. c) The quick and easy solution is to control helicopters in the same fashion.

The quick and easy solution is not always the best, and adherence to a certain method of doing things sim-

ply as a matter of dogma is most dangerous. What we need is to keep open minds on all aspects of the employment of helicopters including control so that by experimenting we may arrive eventually at the "best" solution.

Major General J. F. C. Fuller in his book *Armored Warfare* has some comments concerning the dangers of adherence to dogma and failure to keep open minds which I feel should be emblazoned in gold in the minds of all Marine officers, both ground and aviation. He states, . . . "plasticity of mind cannot be cultivated during war except by an occasional genius; the generality of soldiers simply cannot change if they are dogma ridden. The only way to prevent this ossification of mind is to accept nothing as fixed, to realize that the circumstances of war are ever changing, and that, consequently organization, administration, strategy and tactics must change also, and if during peacetime we cannot change them in fact, we can nevertheless change them in theory and so be mentally prepared when circumstances require that changes shall be made.

"Adherence to dogmas has destroyed more armies and lost more battles and lives than any other cause in war."

The main point of Maj Hunt's article seemed to be that for a variety of reasons (mainly those of command and control of aircraft and problems of logistics), the helicopter should remain under the operational control of the Marine Aircraft Wing. I am generally in agreement with this concept except when the helicopters are employed in an operation. For training, for logistical support etc, the Wing should have control but, for operations with troops, the operational control of the Helicopter Unit *must* rest with the Helicopter Assault Force Commander. I realize that in Maj Hunt's article he is primarily concerned with refuting the arguments for permanent attachment of helicopter units to Marine Divisions. However, in arguing against this *permanent attachment* he at least implies that helicopter units should *never* be under the operational control of troop units. His reasons included the fact that helicopters were used




Chart #1

in Marine Helicopter Squadron 161 in Korea for liaison and transportation flights. Major Hunt did not make it clear to me that his figures for this type mission would've been materially reduced merely by placing HMR 161 under the operational control of the Wing rather than 1st Mar Div. I am of the opinion that aviators are just as prone to misuse transportation as we crunchies.


The current doctrine on helicopters calls for the formation of a Helicopter Assault Force. What is a HAF? A HAF by definition includes a commander and the following units under that commander: a helicopter unit, a helicopter troop unit and a helicopter support unit (Chart #1).

It may be argued that the formation of a Helicopter Assault Force is not essential and that without a HAF there is not a clear need for the assignment of the helicopter unit under the operational control of a troop unit. There is no doubt that there still exists divergent opinions concerning the HAF concept. A problem exists with respect to the control of helicopters and it increases in magnitude as more aircraft are employed in the area of operations. However, once we accept the concept of the HAF as fundamental to our Marine Corps helicopter doctrine then any problem incident to helicopter control must be resolved without detriment to that concept. Insistence on keeping helicopters under the control of the Wing would be detrimental to the HAF concept.

As can be seen from the above, if we accept the HAF concept, we must resolve our problems concerning the control of helicopters without detriment to that concept. It is basic, that if we give a unit to a commander we must also permit him to command that unit. If we form a HAF we must include in that organization a helicopter unit. It seems obvious to me that the HAF Commander must be able to command this *helicopter unit* as well as the *helicopter troop unit* and the *helicopter support unit*. Of course, the HAF commander may be either an aviator or a ground officer.

Yet Maj Hunt insists that the helicopter unit must remain under the operational control of the Wing. If we go along with this insistence that the helicopter unit remain under the operational control of the Wing we can not form a HAF, since by definition, a HAF includes a helicopter unit. Failure to give at least operational control of the helicopter unit will tie the HAF commander's hands. The idea of retaining operational control of the helicopter unit at Wing level is diametrically opposed to the idea of a HAF.

How then can we resolve this conflict? First of all we should correct the use of the term "operational control" as used in Maj Hunt's article. Operational control as normally used connotes a relationship considerably different than that implied. The Major gave me the impression that if a helicopter unit were to be assigned to the operational control of a Marine Division, that Division would then be respon-



**Schneider Peninsula**

sible for the logistical support of the helicopter unit. This would be true if the helicopter unit were attached to the Division; it is not true if the helicopter unit is under the operational control of the Division. Operational control is explained in the *Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage* as follows:

"Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. . . . It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, except when a subordinate requests assistance."

It can be seen from the above that the assignment of a helicopter unit to the operational control of a Marine Division does not burden the Division with the administrative or logistical responsibility for that helicopter unit. By definition and by practice, the parent unit (in this case

the Marine Aircraft Wing) is still responsible for the logistical support of any unit it "farms out" under the operational control of another unit (for example: a Marine Division).

I believe that it should now be obvious that unless a HAF commander has operational control of the helicopter unit which is to lift the troop unit of the HAF, the commander does not have a HAF to command.

This problem of operational control and command relationships of the HAF is one which will concern any commander who desires to use helicopters to lift his troops. Let us see now one solution to the problem from the ground officer's viewpoint. To quote the words so often heard at Marine Corps Schools: "This is a solution — not necessarily the *only* solution."

Let us assume that the US has been at war with Aggressor for a period of several weeks. The decision has been made to launch a series of combined amphibious as-

saults against the Aggressor homeland. The assault we are concerned with is that which is to be made by the Blue Landing Force against Schneider Peninsula.

The Blue Landing Force consists of the 1st Mar Div (Reinf). The overall troop commander of the operation is the CG of the 1st Marine Air-Ground Task Force (1st MAGTF). The 1st MAW has been directed by CG 1st MAGTF to provide air support including helicopter support to the Blue Landing Force. The mission assigned to the Blue Landing Force is to "land at H-Hour, D-Day, attack and seize Seatown and the airfield facilities at Cowtown and contain Aggressor forces in that vicinity. Be prepared to continue the attack inland on order." Major General M. A. Jones, CG of the Blue Landing Force, in order to execute this mission decides he would like to use a portion of his landing force to make a vertical envelopment of Hill 528. He further decides it is necessary to form a HAF to execute this envelopment.

CG 1st MAW, MajGen J. L. Smith, in execution of his directive from CG, 1st MAGTF to provide helicopter support for the Blue Landing Force, consults with CG Blue Landing Force. After his conference with Gen Jones, Gen Smith decides that he can best execute his mission of supporting the Blue Landing Force by assigning operational control of MAG (HR)-16 to the CG Blue Landing Force for the duration of the operation or until such time as the HAF (which is a temporary task organization) is dissolved by Landing Force order.

The mission of the force making the vertical envelopment of Hill 528 will be to prevent the enemy from moving his reserves to counterattack the landings on Red Beaches. The Landing on Red Beaches will be made by the remainder of the Blue Landing Force.

CG Blue Landing Force assigns the ADC of the 1st Mar Div to be the commander of the HAF. The troop list furnished the ADC includes the 5th Marines, 1st Bn, 11th Marines and detachments from shore party, engineers, medical battalion and other division units. The CO MAG (HR)-16 is directed by CG

Blue Landing Force to report to the operating control of the HAF Commander.

Let us see what we now have in the way of organization and also in command relationships. Chart #2 shows that we now have the true organization of a HAF.

The Helicopter transport unit, MAG-16 is shown in the chain of command of the HAF commander since he now has operational control of MAG-16. The helicopter support unit, which consists mainly of shore party personnel, will also include a control party from MAG-16 which will control the local movement of helicopters in the landing zones.

The command relationships of the HAF are shown in Chart #3. The HAF commander is responsible to the CG Blue Landing Force and is under his command. The commander HAF is on a co-ordination co-operation level with the RLT commanders of RLTs 1 and 7 who are also subordinate to the CG Blue Landing Force. The control of aircraft in flight rests with the Naval control agencies, but the operational control of the helicopter unit rests with the Commander HAF where it belongs. The Navy will be able to control the movement of helicopters




Chart #2

through its normal control agencies as explained by Maj Hunt. There is one other control agency, a Helicopter Direction Center which would probably be established on the command carrier to control the movement of the Helicopters in the objective area. All of the necessary control of the helicopters in flight can be performed by the usual control agencies, without interference from the HAF Commander who will still have the operational control of


the helicopter unit and will be in a position to issue orders and directives to this unit. Movements of helicopters required to carry out the orders and directives of the HAF commander, will have to be cleared with the HDC of the Naval control setup. Obtaining permission to launch the helicopters and proceed to a certain landing zone should be no more difficult with the helicopter unit under the overall operational control of a Marine Division than if the helicopter unit were under the operational control of the Marine Aircraft Wing. If control of Air has passed ashore there seems to be no reason why the same control and command arrangement shouldn't work as proposed here.

Placing the helicopter units under the operational control of troop unit commanders during an operation will not detract from the versatility and mobility of the helicopter. Rather, under this command relationship it will give the troop unit leader a means of transportation even more reliable than the Army mule. The helicopter under operational control of the troop unit commander can go wherever a man can go and *will* go wherever the troop commander wants it to go. Under this command relationship the helicopter will be better than the mule because the mule sometimes balked.

US MC

*Ed: Are there any red-blooded aviators who want to take up the cudgel?*

Chart #3



# Random Notes on Korea

By LtCol R. J. Batterton, Jr.

• EVEN THOUGH FIGHTING IN KOREA has been terminated, thoughts and views formulated there will continue to be of interest until some future conflict provides new experience.

Subjects which come to mind are varied but they are all important to the combat Marine. One may or may not agree with the recommendations concerning certain problems, but the problems exist nevertheless.

## Entrenching Tools

Millions of dollars are spent on ordnance, motor transport etc, and yet the man in the trench digs with a pick and shovel (usually of inferior quality) and saws with a hand saw. Indeed, picks, shovels and saws are absolutely necessary. But, there are other tools which would certainly encourage and speed up work on field fortifications. For example, when digging in rock or hard ground nothing does the work as well as an "iron rammer;" any farmer who has dug post holes will tell you this. None of these were available. Also, although we used explosives (when they were available) for cutting through rock, it was slow and inefficient because we didn't have a star drill with which to cut a hole for placing the explosive to the best advantage. For cutting timbers for bunkers, we had one gasoline chain saw per battalion where

we should have had 3 or 4 at least. We hadn't a chance of cutting enough timbers when we consider that one chain saw was supposed to provide cut timbers for 4,500 yards of front.

There must be a continuing search for hand tools and gasoline engine tools to ease and speed the work of the front-line Marine engaged in trench warfare. The excavation or construction industry and, also, the mining industry could probably come up with power tools or modifications of tools now in use which would greatly assist in the digging of trenches and bunkers on an active front.

## Timbers

Whenever a discussion starts on cutting timbers for the construction of bunkers, the remark usually comes in, "but you had pre-fabricated bunkers." There are a number of very appropriate answering remarks, but it is sufficient to say that engineers designed them and it took engineers to put them together. Also, do you remember the size of those pre-fab timbers? They were 12 x 12-inches and there are not many men who could lift one off the ground, much less move it anywhere, especially around those Korean hills. As a result, the few pre-fabs constructed on the line were constructed in areas relatively im-

mune from shellfire. These bunkers were 105mm proof but someone figured up the cost of one of those pre-fabs and it came to about \$2,500.

Everyone has a different idea as to the size and cut of timbers that should be made available for bunkers, fighting holes and trench covers. However, it is believed, that with but few exceptions, all timbers for bunkers, fighting hole covers and trench covers should be pre-cut timbers of 8 x 8 inches and 6 x 6 inches. These timbers will provide ample protection except for a direct hit and they can be man-handled with comparative ease. Direct hits are rare and they are certain to be more rare when lower silhouettes are obtained by using smaller timbers for construction. The bunker will still have a roof that will support tons of rock overcovering. Notching is unnecessary and should be done by the using unit if desired. It was found in Korea that in the majority of cases the pre-notched timbers were never used as intended. In addition to the 6 x 6-inch, it would undoubtedly facilitate certain construction, such as trench covering, by providing timbers with more surface such as 4 x 12-inch.

As for the size of bunkers on the MLR: many of them were far too large. Those large enough to sleep 4 were the rule rather than the ex-

ception. Bunkers on the MLR should be constructed as fighting bunkers, large enough to house only 2 men. This accomplishes a number of things. Being a smaller bunker, it is stronger, presents a smaller target, is easier and quicker to build, and effectively disperses the manpower.

### Sandbags

Another curse was the millions of sandbags which were used and most of them improperly. We would actually have been better off if we had never used sandbags. In spite of orders, instructions and inspections, many bunkers were only half dug in, then built up above ground with sandbags, so that after hard rains the weight of the timbers and the rock and earth covering caused bags to break open or slip, the bunker literally becoming a grave. The same thing occurred when trenches were dug. Only by constant supervision was this practice prevented. The need for sandbags is questionable.

### Barbed Wire

Why is it that after WW II and to the end of the Korean War we still could not get manufactured concertina barbed wire, a basic essential for field fortifications? It is far superior to single or double apron fence, much easier to put out and many times faster. It is the only wire that can be placed on position with any degree of success under fire. Yet, it was a rare and sought after item. The logistical plan should provide for the manufacture and supply of concertina barbed wire for

ample coverage of the entire battle-front.

Wire gloves and cutters were also apparently considered as necessary in only small numbers by the logisticians. When requested, the answer received was that we had our allowance, we just lost them or didn't take care of them. Nevertheless, the supply should be increased because they are easy to lose, they wear out fast and all available men have to work to achieve any speed at all in wiring an extended front.

### Fox Hole Cover

Now as to the fighting holes and fox holes on a contested position such as a new outpost where men are digging in under fire. There is a crying need for a splinter (fragment) proof portable one-man fox hole or fighting hole cover. The fact is, if we take ground and can't dig in and stay there, we are better off

not to move, and, under conditions existing in Korea where the enemy had plenty of artillery and mortars, we should be able to dig in under fire. To do this we should have a fox hole cover which can be used while digging in and after getting dug in. Actual specifications should come through research and development, but some of the characteristics should be as follows:


Portable (easy to carry and handle, weighing less than 50 lbs); shaped so they can be stacked for storage and shipping to save space; fragment proof (as much so as the armored vest); and have a curled edge of 4 to 6 inches on the bottom so that it will rest on earth walls without cutting like a shovel and facilitate it being pushed over the ground while creeping to a selected position to dig in. Such an item may be called impracticable. The armored vest was also referred to in this way at one time but it saves lives and everyone wants to use them. Portable fox holes may cost a little more but we must conserve our manpower regardless of the cost. Therefore, we should develop and test designs and materials for a "portable fox hole" until we have a practical, light weight, portable and splinter resistant protection for digging in and defending from. (Figure 1.)

### Mines

It has been said that our own anti-personnel mines caused more casualties to the friendlies than to the enemy, and I am inclined to agree. It was common for friendly patrols to suffer casualties from our own anti-personnel mines. As a result, the



Figure 1






Figure 2




Figure 3

combat morale and fighting spirit suffered. There was constant dread of mines. It is my contention that we were retarded by our own mines far more than the enemy. Anti-personnel mines are too hard to locate and easily misplotted. When a displacement to the front or rear takes place, or when a relief of lines is effected, all too often the mines are forgotten. There may be situations where the security offered by utilizing antipersonnel mines is worth the risk to our own personnel, but experience in Korea indicates otherwise.

Antitank mines on the other hand—because of the comparatively small number employed, their restricted use mostly to corridors or road networks and the comparatively heavy pressure required to set them off—are a vital weapon for the defense without the danger which accompanies the use of antipersonnel mines.

It is concluded that antipersonnel mines should not be used since sooner or later they are more of a hazard to our own personnel than the enemy. Whereas, antitank mines are well worth their employment.

#### Trench System

The MLR was made up of 3 general trench systems.

In general, the main trench trace

was on the topographical crest, on the military crest, or on the reverse slope. Anything but the military crest for the main trench line was considered by many as wrong. However, after analysis, it was determined that each of these had its place, depending upon the terrain.

Prior to experience in Korea it was thought that in general, trench warfare required a fighting trench for the MLR on the military crest with subsidiary trenches on the reverse slope. It was soon found that on such an extended front, with so few men, the trench system simply had to consist of one main trench serving both as a fighting and a communications trench wherever possible.


It was found that on a razor back ridge of medium height, with a straight or concave forward slope, offering a 300 to 500 yard field of fire, the trench was best located on the topographical crest. (Figure 2.) On this type of terrain, flat trajectory weapons could be fired from the trench with good effect to the front or rear thus providing all around defense. At the same time, the enemy appeared to have difficulty in dropping artillery or mortars on the crest; they were either over or under.

On high mountainous terrain, presenting extensive forward slopes

of 500 to 1,500 yards or more, the only logical trace for the main trench line was on the military crest, its exact location usually depending on its joiner with the trench line on adjacent lesser terrain features (Figure 3). With long-extended forward slopes, if the trench was placed on or near the topographical crest, there was usually too much dead space. Also, as just mentioned, in the joiner with the trenches of adjacent lesser terrain features, if the trench were continued on or near the topographical crest, the additional yardage was many times prohibitive both from the point of view of digging and manning. Therefore, the main trench line on high mountainous terrain features was usually placed to best advantage when it was tied in with the trench line on adjacent terrain features over the shortest possible distance, yet still providing fields of fire from 500 to 1,000 yards. In this way the enemy still has to fight his way up subjected to the effective range of flat trajectory weapons, while our limited man power has a shorter line to occupy.

Why place them on the reverse slope under any condition? Situations do develop, such as the enemy occupying commanding ground to the immediate front (200 to 800 yards). Common reference was, "they are looking down our throat." In many situations like this, particularly where our line extended along a razor back ridge, the only way to escape the enemy flat trajectory weapons was to have the trench line just behind the topographical crest, on the reverse slope, with connecting trenches through the crest to fighting holes and bunkers on the forward slope. (Figure 4.) In this way we were allowed freedom of

Figure 4



movement but still had ready access to our fighting positions on the forward slope.

### Island Defense or Line Defense

While we are on the subject of trenches, the never ending discussion arises as to which is better; to have "island" defense such as the British Commonwealth Forces employed or, to have a continuous main line trench across the entire front such as the 1st Mar Div and the other US units had.

There is an erroneous impression that *all* of the defenses were as stated above. They were not. However, they were characteristic enough to be described in that way. In general there were 3 terrain situations that determined which defensive network would be used: first, a valley or plains area relatively free of bush or forest with more or less isolated hills or mountains dominating the area, (Figure 5); second, the same type area with extensive bush or forest in the flat or valley area (Figure 6); and third, a continuous mountainous or ridge line area, with or without foliage (Figure 7).

Faced with the ever present "economy of manpower" and also employment of the best defense — defense in depth — situations such as Figure 5 demanded organization of the ground as illustrated.

And yet, with the same limitations of manpower, defense in depth is obviated in varying degrees by situations similar to Figure 6. The enemy simply cannot be permitted the opportunity to threaten infiltration,




Figure 5





Figure 6

Figure 7



envelopment of a flank, or isolation of a position where cover and concealment prevent our supporting fires from locating and stopping him.

Figure 7 is typical of the terrain which ran across the greater portion of the 1st Mar Div front. The continuous trench line defense was the obvious solution. However, as previously stated, all of the defenses were not on this order. Defenses similar to Figures 5 and 6 were also present, but to a lesser degree.

### Boundaries Between Units

Recalling the Hwajon-dong area, more familiarly remembered by Unggok and Kungok, brings up the ever present problem of the selec-




Figure 8

tion of boundaries between units on the defense (Figure 8). Here is illustrated the abiding principle of assigning the responsibility for defense of a corridor inclusive to one unit (usually the one most threatened by the corridor). The point in question is this: should an element of the responsible unit (1st Marines) be physically tied in with the adjacent unit (5th Marines) to the extent that it is isolated from its parent unit for both communications and supply? In this situation a reinforced platoon from F-2-1 occupied the MLR from X to Y. The only way they could be supplied was by or through the 5th Marines. As for communications with their parent unit, they usually had none other than by radio. With a terrain situation such as this, certainly the limiting point for the boundary should be at X rather than Y.

Ed: Subsequent shifting of regimental boundaries later changed this situation.

#### Battalion CP

In general, while on the static defense, there were two plans of action in the event of an enemy offensive: one, to pull in the flanks, consolidate and hold by all-around defense the key terrain feature and as many

adjacent mutually supporting critical terrain features as possible and; the other, to be prepared to fall back to secondary positions to the rear. Actually, both of these plans are important and necessary for a properly planned defense. The former is of particular concern and a primary responsibility of battalion commanders on the MLR. Decision on the latter is usually the responsibility of the next higher echelon. The major point of contention in either case was the placement of the battalion CPs. Some thought the battalion CPs should be displaced considerably to the rear in both situations; others thought they

should be drawn in close, even on, to the key terrain feature. My preference by far, in both situations, was the latter. The battalion CP and all its appendages should be where it can function as long as a battalion in name exists. This is the only way the fighting units (companies) can be assured of the support they require and deserve, including command, moral support, arms or communications.

It is an axiom that battalion integrity should be maintained at all times. Exceptional situations, of course, do occur which prevent this. Nevertheless, the view should always be "to maintain the battalion as a whole." The battalion is a potent, integrated, tactical unit which can pass out and absorb a tremendous amount of punishment as long as it can hold together. It follows, that if the heart of the battalion, the command post, is isolated from the main body either by tactical deployment or by enemy encirclement or penetration, the life of the battalion is in grave danger.

#### Machine Gun Locations

Prior to Korea, accepted concept had machine guns emplaced generally as shown in Figure 9. Theoretically, this emplacement provides interlocking bands of grazing fire across the front, while at the same time furnishing mutual protection.

For normal terrain and a normal frontage this school solution is normally the best. However, terrain in Korea was not normal and battalion frontages were in most cases well over twice the accepted maximum.

Korean terrain for the most part consisted of steep main ridge lines with many steep finger ridges lead-

Figure 9



ing off both sides of the main ridges.

Figure 10 shows how a great many machine guns were employed in Korea. It is obvious that at least twice as many machine guns would be required for employment as shown in Figure 9 as compared with that shown in Figure 10. Over an extended front, there simply were not enough machine guns for employment as shown in Figure 9.

There were a number of other reasons for the employment of machine guns as shown in Figure 10. They are as follows:

1) The machine guns were thus emplaced on high ground where they could receive the protection of supporting infantry and also where the enemy had to fight their way up to them.

2) The sectors of fire of the individual guns were thus extended in most cases to 180 degrees traverse.

3) The extreme range of the guns could be employed and the finger ridges could be covered by fire—thereby preventing, to a greater extent, the enemy from making a foothold on a finger ridge prior to assaulting the main ridge line.

4) Lastly, the individual guns could be moved more readily to alternate and supplementary positions.

#### 75mm Recoilless Rifles

There was always considerable discussion as to whether the 75mm recoilless rifles should belong to battalion or regiment. Some felt that since they were direct support weapons, they should belong to battalion. On the other hand, regimental advocates maintained that since the 75mm recoilless had an extended range, in comparison with the 3.6 rocket launcher, they should be under regimental control. Regimental advocates also maintained that the 75mm recoilless could be economically employed to cover the most dangerous avenues of approach when under regimental control. Still, others thought they belonged where they were (regiment) but what was needed was a 57mm recoilless in battalion, like the Army has.

To begin with, although most infantrymen won't turn down any weapons they can get, the 57mm recoilless would not be acceptable because it lacks the range and punch to do the job. Not to be overlooked,




Figure 10

is its inability to deal effectively with enemy bunkers and gun emplacements.

It is my belief that the 75mm recoilless should be a battalion weapon. Although it can be moved from one area to another, under regimental control, *before* an enemy attack—its movement is pretty well localized *after* an enemy attack is underway.

Regiment has its organic tank platoon to meet enemy tank threats. The mobility of the tank platoon and the protection the tank provides its personnel offers to regiment the antitank weapon suited to its echelon. After an enemy attack has begun, the tank platoon can be moved, under fire, wherever it is needed over the entire regimental front. The 75mm recoilless simply does not have this freedom of movement and is therefore confined to the area of its initial location.

To say that battalion has 3.6 rocket launchers, therefore regiment should have the 75mm recoilless because of its extended range, actually supports the argument for battalion. Battalion needs a weapon under its own control, both for antitank and bunker busting, with a range greater than the 3.6 rocket launcher.

Obviously, the 75mm recoilless can be more economically employed by regiment over the regimental front. This is particularly noted when one battalion front contains no avenue of approach for enemy armor, while the other battalion front has 2 or more such likely ap-

proaches. Like the 81s, the 75mm recoilless should be under the direct control of the battalion commander. He is on the spot, knows the situation and terrain, and can take the immediate action required to get the most effective use of a direct support weapon. One might say the 75mm recoilless can be attached to battalion and accomplish the same end, that is, be under the direct control of the battalion commander. But this seldom ever works out satisfactorily; they remain appendages and never become fully integrated.

#### Regiment on the MLR

A problem which has been under discussion in recent months is the composition of the regiment. Should it remain as it is, 3 infantry battalions, each battalion made up of 3 rifle companies, or should it be composed of 3 battalions, 4 companies to a battalion, or 4 battalions, 3 rifle companies to a battalion.

Regardless of how thin the line was in Korea, my vote is against adding another company to the battalion. A battalion commander has all he can handle with his present organization and terrain. In addition to the increased problem of control (units and terrain) the increased supply and administration would reduce the battalion combat readiness. The battalion is the last echelon where the commander has personal control of the troops and supervision of the ground.

The addition of a fourth rifle company would lessen these characteristics of a battalion, the very things that should be preserved.

In fact, in Korea, many on the battalion level felt that the battalion frontages were so extensive that the companies were essentially "on their own."

This led some to the conclusion that for better tactical control, the battalion should have occupied the line with 2 companies, keeping the 3d company in battalion reserve. Obviously this could not be done without also placing the regimental reserve battalion on the line. Even without a regimental reserve it is believed that the front would have been stronger with this deployment. The line would have been tighter to contain minor enemy attacks; local threats or penetrations could be stopped by the employment of immediately available local reserves. On such an extended front it is questionable as to whether a regimental reserve could have been employed in time to prevent local penetrations from developing into breakthroughs of major proportions. As for a general enemy offensive it is probable that a tighter line to defend the MLR, with local battalion reserves immediately available, plus a division reserve regiment to contend with a major breakthrough, would have provided a stronger defense.

Therefore, it would seem to me that a regiment of 4 battalions, each with 3 companies, is the best solution. With the concept outlined above, plus an additional (4th Battalion) in each regiment, there is little doubt that the 1st Mar Div defensive situation in Korea would have been improved.

#### Aerial Photos

Why is it battalion can seldom get aerial photographs? Even when we did get them they were days, even weeks too late.

The infantryman doesn't need a photograph to scale, perfectly vertical, taken at a precise altitude or any other technical specification. All he wants is a print on which he can identify his objective, critical features and enemy fortifications, which is more recent and more realistic

than what he can get from his map.

It is understood that, when the 1st MAW provided the 1st Mar Div all of its air support, aerial photographs, while not common, were attainable and in a minimum time.

Nothing facilitates the success of a patrol or raid like a recent aerial photograph which shows the latest enemy trenches, trails and changes in the appearance of terrain due to bombing and shelling. After intensive shelling or bombing the appearance, and in some cases the very ground form itself, can be changed completely so that nothing but an aerial photograph will suffice for orientation.

It is unanimously agreed that something should be done about this problem. Is it possible to rig a camera in an OY or helicopter to take aerial photographs? Why can't aerial photographs be shot, developed and delivered within a couple of hours to the using unit?

One battalion actually used a press camera over the side of an OY, developed the film and had "adequate" photographs within an hour.

The sooner we realize that the technically perfect aerial photos of higher echelon, days after request, are of little or no use to the fighting men, the better off we will be. A "using" battalion requires only "adequate" aerial photographs but on a priority basis.

#### Night Patrols

Remember the night patrols? How could we forget them? Night after night, rain or moonshine. The question is — was this necessary? That is, patrolling regardless of the visibility. The need for night patrolling while engaged in trench warfare is acknowledged. It is the only way friendly forces can reconnoiter or penetrate enemy positions without prohibitive casualties. But, what is accomplished by sending patrols out on pitch black nights? Patrols were often ordered out when, literally, it was so dark you couldn't see your hand in front of your face; the most prominent terrain feature could not be silhouetted. Under such conditions, we can recall many times when patrols became lost after having moved only a short distance out

from our front lines. This was also the cause of patrols walking into mine fields and sometimes members firing at one another. Engagement with the enemy under such conditions was strictly accidental and usually unproductive and costly to the patrol.

So what should we do? Send no patrols out on those black nights? No, that is not necessarily the answer. We must go back to the stock phrase, "it depends upon the situation." For example, it depends on how far out the enemy position is located, how easy the approach is to it, where the mine fields are located and so forth. But certainly the following principle should apply: Night patrols should normally be conducted only on nights offering some shade of light or when the location is such that artificial illumination can be provided. If patrols are ordered out regardless of how dark it is, the objectives assigned should be directly limited by the degree of darkness.

#### Rifle Ranges

It was 1953 before a bonafide rifle range was available for target marksmanship training. This was principally true because required materials were not available for proper construction. As a result, range firing rifle marksmanship training was practically useless. Targets were made from mimeograph paper and frames were made from scrap, if they could be called frames. Marksmanship was not up to the standard desired for Marines. If there is not such a thing as a range kit, there should be. At the least, a priority item of supply for a unit on the static defense or while in rear area reserve, should be the standard "A" and "B" targets. Also, it is my opinion that far more emphasis should be placed on range firing marksmanship training for units in the field than has been the case in the past. We need more and more and more target shooting throughout the reserve training cycle.

We have discussed a myriad of subjects pertinent to the defensive fighting in Korea. There are many more of equal importance; these simply happen to be those taken from notes made during my tour there.

USMC

# the BREED apart

For the past 180 years men like John Quick and his ilk, a breed indistinguishable — yet apart — have taken crude raw material and molded it into Marines



SOMEWHERE THERE MAY BE A young Marine who doesn't know much about the "Old Breed" of Guadalcanal or a retired Marine who is unacquainted with the "New Breed" of Korea. But no one who has served in the Corps can be unfamiliar with another breed, a "breed apart," as a certain type of Marine has always appeared to me. I do not mean that there is anything setting this breed off so sharply from the others that you can pick them out of a group of Marines 100 per cent of the time. Once they are in an infantry platoon, an artillery battery, a ship's detachment or a flight crew, you can't always spot them, just as you couldn't always tell a man fresh off the 'Canal or back from the hills of Korea without his ribbons. No, that isn't it at all.

The chain of circumstances that sets these men off unmistakably as a special type begins merely as a matter of assignment. Let orders be cut for a man to join the instructional staff at any Marine Corps training base, and he soon becomes a member of this "breed apart." Probably the most necessary and yet the most quickly forgotten members of any military organization are the many instructors who must prepare men for the various duties they will be expected to carry out. In an or-

ganization such as the Marine Corps, every man has to be trained to do many things well, and it is up to his instructors to see that he learns to do them. How many of us remember the motto of the Recruit Depot at Parris Island: "Let's make damn sure that no boy's ghost will ever say: 'If only you had done your job well.'"

The "you" in this motto refers to the staff of instructors whose training was designed precisely to keep us from becoming "ghosts." Yet, after completing Boot training, how many of us ever gave them a thought beyond vows of personal vengeance if we ever caught up with our own DIs again?

Still, you might say that these men, and the others who came after them at Lejeune, Pendleton and Quantico, even overseas when we thought we were old salts and knew everything, really created Marines out of nothing, or at least made them out of such apparently crude raw material that making Marines of them really did seem like an act of creation. It was these men, shouting at us with voices that sounded

like the trump of doom, to whom we owe whatever claim we had to being real Marines. We remember them, if at all, for their proud military bearing, for their impeccable uniforms, for the slight swagger that comes from conviction of one's knowledge and competence. And some of us remember, too, that there was something different about the look of their eyes which marked them apart from other men.

Looking out of their weathered faces were eyes that you ought never to have been able to forget. They sized you up accurately not for what you were worth as you came into their hands, but for what potential military worth was in you for their bringing out. Those eyes seemed cold, determined, yet somehow patient as must be the eyes of all persons who have to teach things over and over again. And if the man had been instructing the same thing for a very long time, the eyes were rather weary-looking, but without having lost the alertness and snap that spot mistakes and keep the culprit from failing to measure up or, worse, from becoming an actual menace.

No man is born with the marks of the "breed apart." It is an extended tour on a vital, but often unrewarded and thankless assignment that makes such men different. Re-

By L. V. Ryan



recruits curse the DI who teaches them close order drill so thoroughly that they can do it in their sleep. Old hands fidget under the repetitiousness of mortar or artillery section drills. And any Boot who hasn't wanted to murder his "snapping-in" instructor at the rifle range must have something wrong in his emotional makeup. Once a man masters a skill and gets out of the hands of his teachers, he tends to feel that he has learned it all by himself. And he seems to assume, depending on the quality of his imagination, that the people who helped him just vanish into thin air or crawl back into the molding of the barracks when they finish their work.

Well, they don't! The whole business may be over for one particular group of recruits or trainees, but the instructor knows there will be another crowd and another and still another to learn the things that he is assigned to teach. Now it was very hard for me to face enemy shell-ing, worse still to face small arms fire for the first time. I was never an instructor in the Corps, so I can't prove this, but after about the 47th time of putting other Marines through a course of training, I imagine that most instructors would be glad to exchange places with a BARman or even the flamethrower man in an assault platoon. For nothing is harder to do than to teach well, and good teaching has to be done over and over again in order to prepare a real fighting force. Those who envied the instructors, left behind at training camps as they themselves embarked for overseas duty probably never considered the self-sacrifice that went into the instruction they received. None of us ever thought in our minds to thank the man whose training gave

us a better chance to do the job well and at the same time survive.

Or if these men later turned up with us in the FMF, we were mildly amused and patronizing toward them at first as theorists now arrived in the world of real men and practical affairs. Yet, as soon as they were taken from their instructional assignments, what had made them seem a different type of Marine disappeared, and all traces of their having been members of a separate species vanished with the termination of their duty as instructors. Thus, the mark of the breed was not a permanently identifying brand at all, such as say, the mark of a "China Marine," but something ephemeral, something less than skin deep which left little or no trace when circumstances were changed for the man who bore it.

Still, here is the odd thing — this may not be true for everyone else, but it is for me — among the many persons whom I knew in the Marine Corps, some of those I remember most vividly are men who struck me at the time as outstanding examples of this curious "breed apart."

I suppose that no Marine will ever completely forget his arrival at Boot Camp. I remember mine very clearly. Several truckloads of us new Boots, after having crossed the bridge over that channel that so emphatically separates Parris Island from the rest of the United States, piled out onto the sand and lined up before a dozen or so men in sharply pressed forest greens. These were our future DIs. Some of them looked really ugly to us, some merely tough, all of them competent and authoritative, as they began to sort us out. It soon became apparent that my friend and I, who were near the tail end of the line, would belong to one of the last two DIs left — either a tall, youthful, handsome sergeant right off the recruiting poster or the short, middle-aged, hatchet-faced corporal with 3 or 4 red-edged stripes on his forearm.

"I hope we get the young guy instead of that mean-looking old so-and-so," my friend whispered to me as the two of them approached our end of the line. I fervently hoped so too.

Naturally we got the old guy, but, contrary to our expectations, this turned out to be one of the best breaks either of us had in 3 years in the Corps. For the young sergeant had the reputation of being the roughest DI on the island, while "Old Hashmark," as our corporal was called, was known for his knack of getting the maximum of discipline out of a minimum amount of effort. He didn't have much rank for his age and length of service and wasn't bucking for much more. Nonetheless, he was a good disciplinarian when he needed to be, and his mean-looking eyes could go cold and steely when anyone made a stupid blunder.

The assistant DI was a corporal from Pennsylvania. He wasn't as quick as "Old Hash," but he could drill a platoon better than anyone else I have ever seen. It wasn't merely showy stuff either — the kind that is all DI's cadence and "monkey drill." With him good drilling was a kind of religious rite and he conveyed this sense of the spiritual quality of the thing to you as you marched and went through the manual of arms to the commands of his rhythmically chanting voice. If you made a mistake and jammed up the platoon or knocked off someone's tropical helmet with the muzzle of your rifle, he didn't merely halt the platoon and cuss you out in the accepted manner. He bawled you out all right, and he would pause before speaking for a long time to let his face color up properly with the boiling red of a DI's mock anger. But his eyes would retain their patience, though they would look a bit weary and disappointed, like those of a missionary among a people who have slid back into their old pagan ways after he has brought to them the word of the true religion. You really did feel awful when he got through with you, not angry and embarrassed at the dressing down, but guilty of having committed something almost like a sacrilege. Good drilling, with intelligent and smart execution of his commands, was to him truly the first step in the ritual of becoming a worthy Marine.

The biggest moment in my Boot experience was our arrival at the rifle range. Here we encountered for the first time the most specialized

and unusual of all Marine instructors. Since the Corps places so much emphasis on teaching every recruit how to shoot, it is small wonder that its rifle range personnel are something remarkable in this world. They are a dedicated lot, dedicated mainly to the proposition that all target area outside the black is forbidden country to good Marines. Of them all, I am sure the most dedicated was our range instructor.

The range instructor's voice was quieter but had more iron in it than those of the DIs, and he was calmer but infinitely more exacting in teaching us his specialty than were the DIs in the many things they had to get across to us. He had, it seemed to me, the worst job in the world. If there is anything deliberately calculated to drive a man insane, it must be conducting "snapping-in" exercises for countless platoons of marksmanship-ignorant recruits. Yet the range instructor did the job day after day, chanting the "snapping-in" sequences in a flat, unhurried voice whose pitch never varied. The man seemed to have no nerves, to be some perfect machine designed to fire "possibles" under all conditions and at all times. In a couple of weeks, despite the fact that we hated him for cramping us into unheard-of positions and making us repeat sighting and marking exercises until we thought we could take it no longer, he conveyed some of that calmness, some of that nervelessness to us. The result was that we got cocky and out of hand on the last day before firing for qualification. We had all fired our last trial run of the course and were feeling that we deserved an afternoon's rest. But the instructor had other ideas. After noon chow, he had us fall out for a final session of sling-adjusting and snapping-in. I guess we felt that we were too good now for this sort of thing and we must have doped off miserably. He didn't say anything at all to us; even the cold, unwavering, fathomless look in his eyes remained unchanged. But that evening the senior DI fell us in and marched us down to the messhall.

"The range instructor tells me you got pretty salty on him this afternoon. OK, then, just to remind you who you are, you knuckleheads are going to ride the range tonight.

I expect you to get this messhall cleaned up before sacktime."

We were shocked at this order; all the other platoons were resting up for the big day and there we were, jeopardizing our chances for qualification by doing slave labor late into the night.

It seemed like a deliberate plot against us, something like fixing a prizefight or a race.

But the coach and the DI must have known that it wouldn't hurt our chances. For, the next morning, though we were mad enough to kill them both, we went out on the firing line and became one of the first boot platoons in the history of PI to qualify 100 per cent on the M1 rifle.

When we got to Camp Lejeune, we ran into a wider variety of instructors, but the marks of the breed were still there. Only now we had specialists for Judo, platoon tactics, gunnery drills, demolitions and so on. Furthermore, we had officers as well as NCOs to teach us the many things an infantryman has to know. In Boot Camp we had seldom seen an officer except at the major inspections. Now we had a captain for an instructor in demolitions and a lieutenant in machine guns.

The demolitions instructor was a slender, boyish person who looked totally harmless, but he too had that look in the eyes which by now I had begun to associate with all instructors. His physical appearance and his mild, schoolteacherly manner belied the nature of his military specialty. For it was his duty to teach us how to commit mayhem with high explosives, and he did it with a relish that surprised and amused us. The way he fondled and caressed a block of TNT as he talked of its murderous qualities was terrible to behold. Over and over again he would repeat the precautions that must be taken with explosives, emphasizing the point that he never wanted us to get careless. "If you do," he would say again and again, "the stuff will get you. In fact," he would add gloomily, "no matter how careful you are, if you handle it long enough it's going to get you anyhow." Then he would nonchalantly set off a tremendous charge that would rock the sandy earth of North Carolina and would send millions of pine needles raining down

on our helmets and under the collars of our dungarees.

There were many others who taught us what we had to know and who taught the same things over and over to others who came before and after us. There was the physical education sergeant, who must have led people through a billion upslap-downs during his instructorial career. There was an NCO in squad tactics, a little man who had 2 Silver Stars and could teach a group of men more in an hour's problem than they had ever supposed there was to know about jungle fighting. And there was the master gunnery sergeant who had been instructing in mortars for so long it was widely rumored that he had taught Lou Diamond all he knew about the "tubes."

Then we went off to war and forgot "the breed apart." But I remember running into my DI on Iwo Jima one gray morning. He was with a company of the 9th Marines that had been caught in the famous "Cushman's Pocket" and had just been relieved by another battalion. He was resting with his squad as our outfit moved up past them to try to launch an attack. I nearly stumbled over him where he sprawled next to the slippery trail before I recognized him. Of course, I was working from a memory of immaculate khaki, of a cockily angled garrison cap above a DI's face reddening in mock anger. But here were rumpled dungarees, soiled with volcanic ash, while under the helmet there showed the bearded, fatigued face of an exhausted infantryman. And the eyes — well, I still can't decide whether they were set and steady from combat weariness, or whether there still remained with him something of the patient, tired, yet fathomless look of "the breed apart."

USMC




# AN AIR P



For Rocketry . . .

For Bombing . . .

For Gunnery . . .



Competition will always bring out the best in any man.

So why not set up air gunnery, rocketry and bombing  
meets patterned after our rifle and pistol matches

# R PROFICIENCY TROPHY

THE 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING finally did it! Can you recall when Marine aviation has ever held a Corps-wide competition with its primary weapons? I'm referring to bombing, rocketry and gunnery. I'll admit my research does not go back much past WWII. However, none of the more senior pilots I've interviewed can tell me of any competition involving more than 2 squadrons. Even this was a catch-as-catch-can affair thought up on the spur of the moment. The subject seldom fails to come up when pilots are shooting the breeze between ordnance hops. Why don't we have a Marine Corps-wide aviation shoot patterned after the rifle and pistol competitions?

Let's give our pilots and ground crews an incentive to improve proficiency in all aspects of air opera-

tions. Training has fallen into the old familiar pattern of gunnery, bombing and rocket flights with an instrument hop thrown in here and there. An added motivation is called for to bring crews to the peak of readiness, to hone up the dull edge of routine.


In combat, successful air operations are only realized as a result of teamwork between ground crews and pilots. Flight discipline of pilots on each mission is mandatory to deliver ordnance on the target in a minimum of time, with a maximum of accuracy. Something is needed to emphasize the ability of a team consisting of a pilot, his ground crew and his airplane to perform under conditions approaching those of actual combat.

How is the best way to accomplish this? The 1st MAW has the answer—

a Wing-wide ordnance competition which they hope will precipitate a Marine Corps-wide aviation competition.

The G-3 section of the 1st MAW had formulated a rough plan for the competition in April of 1954. The Commanding General thought it a good idea and gave the go-ahead. Then the pick and shovel work began. There were many details to work out concerning rules, procedures, acquisition of targets, a scoring system, judges, dates, ad infinitum to the matter of awards. Another difficulty which had to be overcome involved a technicality in the armistice agreement. Although MAG 12 and MAG 33 were in Korea, MAG 11 was in Japan. The terms of the agreement specified that the number of combat-type aircraft on hand in Korea could not exceed the num-

By LtCol R. F. Steinkraus



ber there when the armistice was signed. The Wing did not have enough F9F credits to bring the planes in from MAG 11. It appeared that the MAG from Japan would have to fly and maintain MAG 33 aircraft for the duration of the meet.

Another handicap was the lack of local experience in running a meet of this kind. Precedent had been set by the Air Force in the annual gunnery meets at Las Vegas. However, information on how it was conducted was not available in the time allocated to get the meet underway. Advantage was taken of several pilots' experiences at the Air Force Gunnery School and from those who had been to the Fleet Air Gunnery School. It was from this basic material that the operations section worked out the details on regulations and procedures.

By late May 1954, the concept and rules for the meet were completed in smooth form. The CG bought it, and the long awaited day had arrived. The word went out to the Commanding Officers of MAG 11, 12 and 33 that the first Wing Gunnery-Bombing Meet was to be held. They were invited to participate.

The receipt of this information caused a stir of activity when it reached the squadron level. Here was their chance to prove a fact that they already knew. Their outfit was the best in the Corps and their pilots could fly rings around throttle jockeys from any other outfit. The competition waxed hot within each squadron to pick the best pilot and ground crew. Then came the fly-offs to select the best qualified team to represent the group. Each team was composed of 4 pilots and one alternate; 4 aircraft plus one spare; a ground crew of 4 crew chiefs plus one alternate, 4 ordnance men and one alternate who could be a camera technician, one radio technician, 2 maintenance technicians, one gun-sight technician and 2 radar technicians for those teams whose aircraft were equipped with radar gunsights.

Each group held their final selection of personnel. The preliminaries were completed and each team eagerly awaited the starting gun. The meet was to be held at the K-3 Air Base in Korea where Wing Headquarters was located along with

MAG 33. This site was also chosen because of the ready availability of the air-to-ground ranges as well as aerial gunnery ranges. All of the preparations were concluded. An angle had been figured to allow MAG 11 to fly their own planes into Korea. The solution was simplicity itself. MAG 33 flew 5 of their aircraft to Japan, thus giving the Wing a credit for 5 F9Fs in Korea.

As sometimes happens in large scale proceedings, a foul-up occurred at the last minute. In this case it was the weather. While all hands stewed and fumed, July and August rolled by with too few consecutive days of unobstructed skies to run off the meet. Finally the word was passed; 7 through 11 September would be the dates.

The way now being clear, MAG 11 came over in their F9Fs, MAG 12 flew down from K-6 in their ADs and MAG 33 made room on their line for F9Fs of both outfits. There was a tension of good natured rivalry in the air as the participants met for the pre-meet briefing. Each team had been given copies of the regulations. The briefing was to make certain everyone understood the ground rules. Now was the time to clear up any points of contention.

All concerned seemed satisfied and the meet got underway. There were 6 events scheduled; dive bombing, skip bombing simulating a napalm run, high angle strafe, low angle strafe, high altitude gunnery and low altitude gunnery. The air-to-ground events were conducted on the Naktong Bombing and Gunnery Range located about 60 nautical miles WNW of K-3. The air-to-air events were conducted on the K-3

gunnery range located off the east coast of Korea about 45 miles NE of K-3.

The high and low altitude gunnery events presented somewhat of a problem since both jet and propeller driven aircraft were involved. It was solved in this manner; for the F9Fs—high altitude gunnery was done with the tow at 20,000 feet and 170 knots air speed; for the ADs—15,000 feet and 135 knots. Low altitude gunnery was done by the jets with the tow at 12,000 feet and 175 knots; by the prop aircraft at 8,000 feet and 140 knots.

All flights were scheduled by the Gunnery-Bombing Meet Operations Officer appointed by the Wing. A panel of judges was appointed to score each event and a rules committee was also established as the final arbitrator on all questions arising during the meet.

Three flights were scheduled per team each day. They were penalized if they failed to meet the flight as scheduled. A time limit on target was set to complete each mission. For example, 30 minutes was allowed for the completion of 11 runs per aircraft during the dive bombing and high angle strafing events, which were combined into a single mission. The same amount of time was allowed to complete the combined skip bombing and low angle strafing events for a total of 13 runs per aircraft. These limitations meant that an airplane would be on the target every 41 seconds and 34 seconds respectively for the above events. The time limitations also required a high degree of radio and flight discipline during the flight.

No malfunction or make-up flights





were allowed. Once the mission was scheduled the team was charged with the bomb and gun load unless the flight was cancelled because of weather. All gunnery flights were loaded with 60 rounds in the 2 in-board guns. The bombing hops were loaded with 2 bombs. Dropping only 2 bombs per sortie placed a higher than normal responsibility on the team for determining target winds. It also closely simulated combat conditions where it is unusual to make more than 2 passes at the target.

The alternate pilot on each team flew only in the event another pilot on his team was grounded. He performed the duties of ground observer and inspected other teams' flights for discrepancies prior to take-off and after landing. Points were credited for the bombs released, ammunition fired, radio functioning and gun camera operation. The alternate pilot also acted as an official scorer at the Nakdong Air-to-Ground-Range and scored the aerial banners. Judges for the air-to-air events were appointed by the Wing. They also acted as tow pilots and judged the flights both for time on and off the target and the number of runs made by each pilot.

A total of 149 sorties were flown, with only one abort due to mechanical failure. This is a fantastically high availability of 99 per cent. It can only be attributed to the employment of the most qualified personnel available to each team. The relatively short period of the meet, as opposed to continual operations, was also a contributing factor. Nevertheless, it did demonstrate that relatively high efficiency in utilization of equipment can be achieved by the employment of well-qualified

maintenance personnel.

The majority of the awards were won by the team from MAG 33. The meet was held at K-3, where they were located, because of the availability of targets and air space for gunnery. This once more emphasizes the fact that there is no substitute for practice. In the case of MAG 11, the tactical squadrons had been involved in maneuvers which were completed just prior to the meet. In addition, 2 of the squadrons were scheduled to be rotated to the US immediately upon completion of the meet. MAG 11 did not have gunnery-bombing ranges as readily available for their use as the Korea-based squadrons. In the case of MAG 12, the team participating in AD-type aircraft, 2 fatal accidents had placed structural restrictions on their aircraft. This deterred them from exploiting the full capability of that heavy hauler. Rockets were not employed because of an unsatisfactory target for the marking of hits.

Our Commandant rightly places great stress on proficiency with individual weapons, the rifle and pistol. This is a great heritage of the Marine Corps, the intensive production of expert marksmen. The more qualified reach the ultimate in competition for the coveted Marine Corps Pistol, Lauchheimer, Elliott, Wirgman, San Diego, David S. McDougal Memorial, Calvin B. Matthews and Inter-Division Rifle Team Trophies. In addition to these trophies, Distinguished Marksman and Distinguished Pistol Shot, Division and Marine Corps Badges are awarded. Considerable time and effort is expended in reaching these objectives. The training is put on a par with that of qualifying in an MOS.

Shouldn't aviation have the same

incentive for proficiency in its primary weapons; the rocket, bomb and 20mm? There has never been a provision for the aviator to compete with other than his squadron mates with these weapons. Minimum standards for individual proficiency in rocketry, bombing, air-to-air gunnery and strafing are set up by the Navy in their *Training and Competition Manual*. But that is still on an individual basis. There is no competition outside of the squadron that one can see and feel. Some effort was made to increase the individual proficiency through the awarding of the Navy "E" to those pilots who were outstanding. But what about the rest of the team—the ground crew. The awarding of a Navy "E" pennant to the outstanding squadron has not served this purpose.

Rocketry, bombing and gunnery are the meat and potatoes of an aviator's flying. The essence of his flying is the delivery of the ordnance to the right place at the right time with a maximum of accuracy. We must never cease to strive for perfection through a process of training to bring above-average results. The 1st MAW has pointed the way. The precedent has been set. Let's take it from there.

Competition will always bring out the best in any man. As a result it raises the over-all standard of the competing group. What better way is there to increase the proficiency of our pilots? Let all 3 Wings follow the pattern set by the 1st MAW. Take the top teams from each Wing and have them compete on a Marine Corps-wide basis at El Toro or Cherry Point. Establish a traveling trophy for the winning team, and individual awards for the top pilots and ground crews.

The benefit to the Marine Corps is obvious. The end result would be to raise the over-all proficiency of the tactical pilot in the use of his primary weapons. This in turn would produce greater efficiency in the support of our brothers on the ground, which after all is our primary mission. Finally, there would be a definite goal toward which the pilot and ground crewman could point—not the nebulous honor carrying no incentive, but the gratifying reward of a job not only well done, but also recognized. USMC

# German Operations Planning



Wide World

## By Fieldmarshal von Manstein

*The study of history must be a vital part of a professional soldier's education, or as Shakespeare adroitly put it, "The past is prologue." (The Tempest)*

*In a sense, the military essay presented here by Fieldmarshal von Manstein, even though it is still recent history, has a valid application to the study of relationships between the makers of national policy (the politicians and statesmen) and the executors of that policy (the soldiers). Our own recent experiences in the war in Korea may even be somewhat analogous.*

*This is the first English presentation of Fieldmarshal von Manstein's work. The author has condensed this essay from his book *Lost Victories*, published in Europe by Athenaem Press, Bad Godesberg.*

*The translation was done by Capt H. W. HENZEL.*

# ing for the Campaign in the West

WARFARE BELONGS TO THE REALM of surprises. But seldom does the beginning of a war bring such grave surprises to those involved as was the case in the fall of 1939.

The first surprise—though only for Hitler and his foreign minister Ribbentrop—was the declaration of war by Great Britain and France.

The second surprise—this time for the opponents of the Reich—was that the campaign in Poland took a completely different course than the political and military leadership of the Western powers, still captivated by their concepts of the positional warfare of 1915-1918, had imagined. Within 4 weeks the Polish army, and even the Polish State itself, was eradicated by a sweeping offensive. The hope of the Western Powers, to entangle the Reich in a two-front war, seemed to have melted away—even more so since the Soviet Union had taken part in the defeat of Poland.

But also for the Germans, this first week of the war brought a military surprise: the complete inactivity of the Western Powers, who did not raise a finger to come to the aid of their hard-pressed ally.

Thus it was that by the end of September 1939 both parties were confronted with a military situation which neither had envisioned. New decisions were required.

## The Western Powers

Concerning the Western Powers, it could hardly be expected that they would alter their strategy.

If they had not waged an offensive as long as the Polish army still stood in the field—in spite of the fact that they would have been far superior to the German military forces deployed along the western border of Germany—it seemed less likely that they would act now after their ally had been eliminated. A War Plan, drawn up at that time by the order of Gen Gamelin, the Allied Supreme Commander, which

fell into German hands in 1940, confirmed that the Western Powers wanted to pursue a "waiting" strategy.

In the War Plan it was established that the Allied military powers would not be able to build up enough material strength before spring of 1941 to confront Germany with an offensive in the West. To attain a numerical superiority of ground forces would necessitate the acquiring of additional allies.

The British would not be ready to take part in a large-scale offensive before 1941, except in the case of a partial collapse of Germany. (Author's note: This latter assumption established that they obviously counted upon an upheaval within Germany, but that the removal of the Hitler regime would not have brought the end of the war.)

Furthermore, it was stated that the principal mission of the Western Powers for the year 1940 must be to guarantee the inviolability of French territory, and in the case of a German attack against Belgium and Holland that they would naturally rush to the aid of these countries.

Besides that, effort should be made to create further attritive theaters of war for Germany. Mentioned as such were the Scandinavian countries and—if Italy remained neutral—the Balkans. The efforts to win Belgium and Holland for the Allied side should, of course, be continued.

Finally, effort should be made to rob the Reich of its vital imports by completely closing the blockade by means of pressure on neutral powers, as well as the aforementioned creation of new theaters of war.

Out of this "War Plan" which was to be placed before the head of the French government, the intention can doubtlessly be seen. The Western Powers planned to carry on a war of attrition—preferably in other theaters of operations—until un-

questioned superiority would permit them to take the offensive in the West—in no case prior to 1941. It was strategy which certainly suited the position and interests of the *seapower*, Great Britain, less than that of the *landpower*, France—to say nothing of Poland. Regarding the question of how the military leadership of the two Western Powers should and could have reacted in the case of a German offensive, will have to be dealt with later.

## The German Side

From the middle of September, the time from which it could be seen that the victory over Poland was certain and that the Western Powers had missed the chance to confront the German Wehrmacht with the task of a two-front war, it was necessary for the German command to revise their strategy on the Western Front.

Before, and at the beginning of, the war it had been a foregone conclusion that the German forces were prepared only for the defensive in the West. Who could have expected that the Western Powers would so shamelessly abandon Poland, to whom they had given a guarantee? Their weak attack against approaches into the West Wall in the Saar, soon followed by a withdrawal behind the French border, could not at all be considered as preparation for a later-planned large-scale offensive.

The German command could only wait, fully expecting such an offensive immediately after the beginning of the war. Would it be possible to bring it to a halt at the West Wall, or—if it was directed through Luxemburg and Belgium against the Ruhr—to conduct a counterstroke after the disengagement of forces in Poland? This hesitation by the Western Powers now presented a completely new situation. The military defeat of Poland was certain and the Soviets had also

intervened by the middle of September. At that time an exchange of ideas should have taken place between Hitler (as the political and at the same time military leader) and the Army High Command (OKH—*Oberkommando des Heeres*) concerning the question of operations on the Western Front. As far as can be gathered from current publications, however, this was not the case.


### Hitler overrules the OKH

It can be assumed that Hitler's reaction to the brilliant success in Poland as well as the unexpected lack of aggressiveness by the Western Powers was completely different than that of the members of the OKH. The fact that the British-French Army did not take the offensive in the West was undoubtedly assumed by Hitler as a sign of their weakness. This, then, would permit him to go over to the offensive. The astounding success of the Polish campaign had convinced him that the German Wehrmacht had to be capable of carrying out practically *every* assignment. The OKH was in no way in agreement with this latter idea. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Col Gen von Brauchitsch, apparently judging from single examples, came to far-reaching conclusions concerning the integral combat readiness of the units. This showed itself here and there among the troops during the Polish campaign. One finds it in the beginning of every war among units inexperienced in combat. When he brought this to the attention of Hitler (who considered the new Wehrmacht as *his own* creation), it undoubtedly strengthened Hitler's inclination to pass over the interpretations of the OKH. By so doing, he pushed aside at the same time the well-founded and justified opinion of Col Gen von Brauchitsch: that all the divisions newly formed by mobilization (which comprised a great part of the army) were not prepared for an offensive—as evidenced by their training and organic state of combat readiness. Hitler thereby showed himself to be a military dilettante.

From the military hesitancy of the Western Powers, however, the OKH wanted to draw the conclusion that perhaps they only entered the war to save face. Therefore, it should be still possible to come to an under-

standing with them as long as the "shadow boxing" on the Western Front did not develop into a major action. In addition to this, the OKH obviously believed that our clearly established intention to remain on the defensive in the West—established by Hitler at the beginning of the war—was not subject to change. (Hitler had prohibited every preparation which could serve a possible later offensive—for instance, the construction of advanced

FPG



**Commander-in-Chief of the Army  
—von Brauchitsch**

airstrips for the Luftwaffe.) The OKH, to be sure, had therewith been deceived by Hitler's mentality.

In any case, the OKH allowed Gen Heinrich von Stuelpnagel to work out a study during the second half of September concerning the further conduct of the war in the West. In this, Stuelpnagel came to the conclusion that the army would not be in any position to break through the Maginot Line, materiel-wise, prior to 1942. The possibility of its being outflanked through Belgium and Holland was not considered, since the government of the Reich had shortly before concluded treaties with these countries guaranteeing them neutrality. On the basis of this study and the aforementioned earlier attitude of Hitler, the OKH obviously followed the inference that, in the West, a defensive course of action should be continued. Accordingly, at the conclusion of the campaign in Poland the reinforcement of the defensive buildup by the Army in the West was ordered—manifestly without the prior assurance of Hitler's approval.

With this completely new situa-

tion, which had arisen as a result of the complete collapse of Poland, such a procedure had no other meaning than that the OKH allowed Hitler to take the initiative in making decisions about possible new plans. On the other hand, the result of that study could not be looked upon as a solution to the question of the further conduct of the war if an understanding with the Western Powers could not be reached. If one were to wait until 1942 in order to break through the Maginot Line, then presumably the Western Powers would have caught up with the German lead in armaments. Over and above this, however, a decisive operation could never be developed after a successful breakthrough of the Maginot Line. On the enemy side we were confronted with at least 100 divisions which stood available already in 1939. A decision on this course of action would never have been successful. Even if the enemy should throw strong forces into the defense of the Maginot Line, he still could have 40 to 60 divisions as operational reserve. These would have been sufficient, also, to contain a successful German penetration through the fortified defenses on a wide front—even possibly to defeat the German forces which had broken through. A slow disintegration of the German offensive directed against the Maginot Line would probably have been the result in this positional warfare. This certainly could not be the objective of the German command! Of course, it cannot be assumed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch, and his Chief of the General Staff, Halder, were of the opinion that they could continue with a purely defensive strategy in the long run. Nevertheless, for the time being they perhaps set their hopes on a possible settlement in the West or that the Western Powers would finally take the offensive.

The decision concerning the first possibility, however, lay beyond the sphere of their influence—it was up to Hitler and the governments of the Western Powers. Naturally, this would not have eliminated the right of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to present to the Chief of State the idea of finding a way to political settlement—in view of

their military strength, or in the event a German offensive could not be brought to a decidedly successful conclusion in the West. In case this course would not prove to be feasible, the OKH still had to have an alternate solution ready for ending the war by military means. In addition, to complicate matters, it was doubtful that Hitler was ready to come to a peaceful solution with the Western Powers. One thing was certain, however: he was no longer in a position to comply with a demand of the Western Powers for the re-establishment of Poland, since the eastern part of that country had been given up to the Soviets—not to mention his promises regarding the Baltic states.

With regard to an alternate solution, there were 3 questions to be answered:

First: Could the war be brought to a favorable conclusion by further continuing the defensive in the West, or was such only to be achieved by means of a victorious German offensive?

Second: *When*, if the occasion arose, could such an offensive be conducted with the prospect of positive success?

Third: *How* should it be conducted in order to achieve a complete decision on the Continent?

To the first question, it is to be concluded that by waiting on the defensive, the prospects of coming to a favorable decision on the Continent would only be possible if the Western Powers went over to the offensive. Certainly it was an alluring thought to force upon the enemy the difficulties of an offensive against the West Wall or the odium of breaking the neutrality of Luxembourg, Belgium or even Holland, in order to be the first to strike a decisive blow from the rear. Presumably this thought played a role in the deliberations of the OKH. But wasn't the point in question—at least for the present time—merely a wishful thought, whose realization was more than unlikely? From the previously mentioned War Plan of the Supreme Allied Commander, we subsequently learned that he had decided only to go over to the offensive when the Western Powers had reached a point of unquestioned superiority. This enemy superiority

was to be achieved through their own arms build-up as well as through the winning of new allies and the creation of further theaters of attritive war. Naturally, at that time these facts were unknown to the OKH, but the ideas were nevertheless very obvious. The Western Powers did not risk an offensive at such time as the mass of the German strength was tied down in Poland. Could it now be expected that they would attack after the Wehrmacht confronted them in full strength? So even at that time, the hope that the French-British army would take the offensive before the Allies reached a definite superiority on land and in the air, seemed to be unlikely. A period of waiting beyond a favorable time for a German offensive would seem to be fatal. A military proposal for the further conduct of the war could not be based on a strategy of waiting on the defensive in the West. This was based on the assumption, of course, that there would be no possibility for a political settlement.

Concerning the second question—*When* a German offensive could be conducted—the OKH and all the field commanders on the Western Front were unanimous that such action promised no positive success in the late fall of 1939. A decisive reason was the weather. In the fall and winter, the German Wehrmacht could not effectively play its ace cards—the fast Panzer units and the Luftwaffe. In addition, the shortness of the days at this time of year hardly permitted a tactical decision in one day and thereby hindered the conduct of a speedy operation. Another reason was the still incomplete state of training and readiness of all the new units organized at the war's beginning. In the fall of 1939, only the regular divisions were combat-ready. Depending upon these, however, one could not conduct a conclusive offensive against the numerically superior enemy. There were also essential deficiencies in the Luftwaffe. Regarding the strength of the German forces, the spring of 1940 was, therefore, the time they could undertake an offensive. Then too, this was the last opportunity for complete success. To wait longer would mean that the enemy would become even stronger, not to mention the latent

danger which the Soviet Union—now the immediate neighbor of the Reich—posed in its rear.

The alternate military solution, in case a political settlement could not be reached in the fall of 1939, had to be: that an offensive in the West must be conducted in the spring of 1940, with the objective of a complete decision on the Continent. Should the Allies, themselves, in spite of all possibilities, go over to the offensive before that time, or should the prospect arise that an agreement would be reached—then so much the better. It is known that Hitler insisted upon launching the offensive in the fall, or, at least in the winter of 1939/40. But finally the forces of Nature proved themselves to be stronger, so that the German offensive could not be launched before spring 1940.

The third question—*How* a German offensive could be conducted—will now be considered. Here it is only surmised that the OKH, by hesitating to present to Hitler an offensive plan, surrendered their power. The offensive plan which Hitler now forced upon the OKH, as will be discussed later, was incomplete. He did not aim at a final decision on the Continent, but only at partial victory. This would have been the point at which the OKH could have made it clear to Hitler, that his military advisors would have something better to offer than a partial decision which would not justify the risks. An audacious proposal for a solution of the "how" would have perhaps have resulted in Hitler's giving in to the question "when." Therefore, it came about that Hitler, on 27 September, confronted the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (as well as to the other two branches of the Wehrmacht) with a *fait accompli* of the decision to seize the offensive in the West as soon as possible. In a memorandum of 9 October, without previous consultation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, not only did he give the command to assume the offensive in the West, but at the same time he also decided upon the question "when" and "how." Questions, which never should have been decided without the collaboration of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

### The Operations Plan of Hitler vs that of the OKH

In his memorandum of 9 October, Hitler had already established the principal outlines of his intended western offensive. It was to begin as soon as possible—in any case even in the fall of 1939. A powerful right flank was to advance through Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg to outflank the Maginot Line from the north. The enemy strength in the Maginot Line area was to be tied down by a part of the German forces (an army group).


On the basis of this memorandum, the OKH issued its first deployment order on 19 October despite the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Chief of the General Staff and the senior staff officer of the General Staff

(OQuI—operations) did not agree with Hitler's proposed plan for the offensive. Thereby the OKH found itself in the position of a *capitis diminutio* by which it was degraded from the responsible position of leading the operations on land to a *niveau* of acting only as an echelon of command. It can be assumed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army had hoped—if he at first would agree to Hitler's ideas—to be able to dissuade him from the offensive later on. These attempts, however, only intensified the tension between Hitler and the OKH, which came close to a break between him and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. With regard to the question of timing and weather, the OKH was right.

The first deployment order of the

OKH provided for—according to Hitler's instructions—a strong right flank, which would have to go through Holland and northern Belgium in order to defeat the French-British forces expected in Belgium along with the forces of Holland and Belgium. By means of this powerful thrusting wing, a decision was to be sought. This wing was formed by Army Group N and Army Group B and deployed in the area of the Lower Rhine and the Nordeifel Mountains. Army Group B (ColGen von Bock) was divided into 3 armies. Altogether, the northern flank included 30 infantry divisions and the greater portion of the mechanized units (9 Pz Divs and 4 Mot Inf Divs). With 102 divisions, which was the total at the disposal of the Western Front, this was near-

### The original plan foisted upon the OKH—an unrealistic imitation of the 1914 Schlieffen Plan



ly half the entire German strength. While the job of putting Holland out of commission fell to Army Group N, Army Group B was to attack in a northerly direction, passing to the south of Liege, through northern Belgium. Thereby it was thought that the Panzer units would have a decisive role in the attempt to overrun the enemy.

Further to the south, Army Group A (ColGen von Rundstedt) with 22 infantry divisions comprising 2 armies, was to advance through southern Belgium and Luxemburg with the task of covering the left flank of the assault wing. Army Group C (ColGen von Leeb) with 2 armies totaling 18 infantry divisions, had the task of tying down the enemy in the Maginot Line between the Mosel and the Swiss border. On 29 October this first deployment order was changed in that Holland was to remain out of the plan. It is possible this was traceable to the concepts of the OKH. As a result, Army Group B had to advance on both sides of Liege with 2 armies in the first wave (Fourth and Sixth) and 2 in the second wave (Eighteenth and Second). Later on, however, Holland was again included in the operation. The job of securing Holland now fell to the Eighteenth Army.

The decisive movement of Army Group B was to be covered on the southern flank by Army Group A. It was deployed in the southern Eifel and the Hunsrueck mountain ranges. Its Twelfth Army was to accompany the advance of Army Group B, echeloned left so to speak, in order to prevent the envelopment of its flank by the enemy forces as it advanced forward. The Sixteenth Army, after passing through Luxemburg, had to wheel to the south in order to protect the entire operation on the deep flank with a good defensive position. This, essentially, was to have been situated immediately north of the western spur of the Maginot Line between the Saar and Meuse rivers eastwards of Sedan. Army Group C continued in its previously anticipated assignment.

In reserve there were 17 infantry divisions and 2 mechanized divisions available.

After the assignment of forces (described above), the operational ob-

jective is paramount in the examination of an operations plan. Here's how it was designated in the deployment order of 19 October:

"The defeat of as great a part as possible of the French and Allied armies. Simultaneously, to seize as much of the territory of Holland, Belgium and northern France as the basis for conducting an anticipated air- and sea-war against England and as a broad buffer zone for the Ruhr area." As the first objective for the attack the OKH assigned the assault wing: "Subsequent to the elimination of the Dutch forces, to defeat the greatest part of the Belgian army in the area of the border fortifications. Create conditions for an immediate continuation of the attack with a powerful northern wing and for the immediate occupation of the Belgian coast, through the rapid co-ordination of stronger — especially faster — units."

Wide World



**Commanding General, Army Group A — von Rundstedt**

The rewriting of the deployment order of 29 October broadened these established objectives in certain ways.

The "General Intentions" were now to be:

"To bring to battle and to defeat the greatest possible part of the French army in northern France and Belgium and therewith create favorable preliminary conditions for the further conduct of the war against England and France on land and sea."

As the first task for the assault wing, the OKH henceforth established, "to destroy the Allied forces in the area north of the Somme and to break through to the Channel coast."

Also, now as before, the vast defensive covering assignment of Army

Group A was somewhat broadened insofar as its northern army (Twelfth) was to drive as rapidly as possible over the Meuse at, and south of, Fumay and continue on through the fortified French border zone to the general vicinity of Laon.

One can best clarify the operational aims contained in both deployment orders as follows: A strong right jab was to defeat that part of the French-British army which was expected to be in Belgium, while the (weaker) left jab was to be responsible for covering this thrust. The operational objective, with respect to territory, was the seizure of the Channel coast. What was required after this first blow remained to be seen.

### **The Fight over another Plan**

The operations plan outlined above did not remain uncontested.

The Commander-in-Chief, Army Group A (whose Chief of the General Staff the author was at the time) agreed with the OKH that Hitler's timing for a fall or winter offensive offered no guarantee of success. The other field commanders on the Western Front fully concurred with his point of view. Moreover, he pointed out that the operations plan, whose principal features Hitler of course had defined, would hardly offer the prospect of reaching a conclusive decision in France. According to our opinion, however, a positively decisive objective was the only one for which the entire offensive capability of the German army should be employed (certainly considering the Soviet Union in our rear). As a result, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, from 31 October to the end of January, by constantly renewed requests, attempted to have the OKH accept a new operations plan. If only a short statement about the development of the "new plan" can be given here, the author believes himself to be qualified to do so, in as much as the proposals and considerations for this plan were his own. A confirmation which is not detrimental to the reputation and credit of the Commander-in-Chief, Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt, who sanctioned the proposals of his chief of staff and who supported his opinion at the highest echelon. This would not be brought up here, had this fact not been already known

for years — as a result of correspondence between Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt himself and the British military writer Captain Liddell Hart.

Our objections to the plans of the OKH rested on two basic points: First — the operation plan obviously did *not* establish the *objective*: to strive for a complete decision on the Continent, yet it did appear to be adaptable enough to assure this, should the course of battle be favorable. Second — it did not make allowance for the strategic possibilities available to determined leadership on the Allied side, even if the planned German operation were accomplished.

At first glance, the concept of Hitler or that of the OKH which aimed at the complete decision in France appear to resemble the "Schlieffen Plan," which did not reach its sought-after objective in 1914 only because of its incomplete execution by Schlieffen's successors. Count Schlieffen had planned to surprise the enemy by a march through Belgium in order to encircle the enemy from the north with a "long" arm, so to speak, in order to sweep all of northern France clean and attack Paris from the west. Thus, all of the enemy armies would finally be pressed against the Metz-Vosges-Swiss border front and be forced to capitulate.

This concept was, however, not capable of being repeated in the year 1939, for its pre-suppositions were no longer valid. A German invasion of Belgium and Holland would no longer surprise the Western Powers. Strong British-French forces stood on the French-Belgian border ready, in case of a German attack, to rush immediately to the aid of the Belgian and Dutch armies. Even so, if the German assault wing succeeded in quickly overcoming the strong Belgian border fortifications as well as the natural obstacles in Holland, then they would still have to fight more or less frontally against an enemy numerically equal in strength. A victory depended on *tactical* success; it could not be assured by the strategic attack of the German forces. Considering the expected ratio of forces on the battlefields of Belgium, there was a much greater danger that the end result of a successful frontal assault would

be the choking of the German offensive on the lower Somme.

In the operations plan of 1939, therefore, the planning (exemplified by the Schlieffen Plan to aim at a complete decision against the enemy armies) was not at all complete. The attainment of the operational objective would clearly be only a partial victory against the enemy forces expected in northern Belgium. At the same time there must be an acquisition of territory which would bring the Channel coast into German hands in order to win a basis for the further conduct of the war against England. This was not successful in 1914. A complete decision could hardly be reached this way, especially if one considered the resulting strategic possibilities of the enemy.

The OKH could not reckon in 1939 — as Schlieffen had done and as also happened in 1914 — that the enemy would "do us the favor" of conducting a premature offensive from the middle of the whole front (out of Lorraine) and thereby run into the encirclement intended for him through Belgium. On the other hand, the operations plan of the OKH offered to the enemy the possibility of achieving a crushing blow from the rear. Even if the Allied supreme commander would throw strong forces into Belgium, he had still 40 to 60 divisions available — even with the complete occupation of the Maginot Line — to launch a decisive counterattack into the southern flank of the German assault wing. In the meantime, the farther Army Group B would have advanced to the west, the greater the danger that their frontal offensive would come to a standstill at

the lower Somme. And, consequently, the more effective such an enemy counterblow would be if it were launched on both sides of the Meuse or between the Meuse and the Oise. That the strength provided to Army Group A by the OKH would be sufficient to ward off such a strong counterattack, was rather doubtful. Offhand, it was impossible to know whether or not both sides would finally become immobilized in a war of position on a front approximately along the Maginot Line, extended to the lower Somme. In no case, however, would such a tactical development have been favorable for the German side which was striving for a final decision in the western theater of operations. If, while formulating the plan for the operation, Hitler and the OKH had perhaps reflected on the words of Moltke — that no operations plan could predict with any certainty the outcome of the first clash with the enemy main body — they would not have overlooked a vital point. This point was, namely, that any decision concerning the future conduct of the operation was dependent upon the outcome of the battle in Belgium. It could always be expected that in Belgium there would be only a partial decision against a segment of the enemy strength. The operations plan, however, had to consider the *over-all results*. To be sure it could not — as Schlieffen had planned it — aspire to a *single* continuously-conducted operation. However, in order to come to this over-all decision, two things were necessary:

1) The victory which was to be strived for in Belgium, even though only a partial victory, *had to assure*

***Eben Emael — the Belgian border defenses were known to be strong***



the annihilation of all the enemy forces fighting there in order to achieve a definite superiority for the second part of the campaign.

2) At the same time every attempt of the enemy to conduct a counter-attack against the southern flank of the German assault wing with superior forces had to be prevented. By this action a favorable starting point for the second phase of the campaign had to be created—one whose objective would have to be the defeat of all enemy forces which could not be caught in Belgium. From the point of view of the Commander-in-Chief, Army Group A, neither of these problems was resolved in the operations plan of the OKH.

During the course of the next few months we presented to the OKH the proposals of the Commander-

in-Chief, Army Group A. (Fortunately, the weather conditions forced Hitler to postpone the beginning of the offensive again and again.) These proposals can be summed up:

1) The final goal of the German offensive dare not become confused by striving for partial objectives, as they were set down in the deployment order of the OKH. They must lead to the final decision on land.


2) The center of gravity of the assault operation would have to be with Army Group A and not with Army Group B. The anticipated assault of Army Group B would strike at an already prepared enemy more or less frontally. It might probably be initially successful, but under the circumstances would choke itself out on the Somme.

A real opportunity lay with Army

Group A by means of a surprise attack against the enemy *through the Ardennes* (where he certainly did not expect the employment of armored forces because of the terrain). This must continue in the direction of the lower Somme in order to cut off the enemy forces which had been thrown forward of the Somme into Belgium. Only in this way could it be hoped that annihilation of the whole northern flank of the enemy in Belgium would produce the preliminary conditions for a final decision in France.

3) Likewise, as the greatest opportunity, so also the greatest danger for the German offensive would be with Army Group A. If the enemy reacted in an orthodox manner, he would try to withdraw from the unfavorable situation in Belgium mov-

**Von Manstein's plan — through the Ardennes and anticipation of an enemy counterthrust**



ing back behind the Somme. At the same time he would ready all available forces for a counteroffensive of great depth against our southern flank with the intention of encircling the greater part of the German army in Belgium especially those forward of the Lower Rhine. If the French leadership could hardly be credited with such a daring solution, and even if their Allies would be opposed, it nevertheless was not to be excluded. At least it could be assumed that the enemy, by determined efforts, would have the capability of bringing our offensive to a standstill in front of a new defense line: Maginot Line - Aisne - lower Somme.

In order to prevent this, it was important to reduce and eliminate, even in the very beginning, any enemy deployment on our southern flank. We had to anticipate an enemy offensive in the area between the Meuse and the Oise and had to destroy the unity of his front, in order to acquire the capability of cracking the Maginot Line from behind in the second phase of the campaign.

For the realization of these operational concepts, the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A demanded:

1) The assignment of strong armored formations, whose surprise attack through the Ardennes against the enemy would clear the way for further operations as we proposed.

2) The reinforcement of the Army Group by a third army (which was to be injected into the front line with the progressive capture of territory in the advance). From these three armies of the Army Group, the northernmost, after crossing the Meuse had to drive on in the direction of the lower Somme. This was necessary in order to cut off those enemy forces involved in the battle against Army Group B in northern Belgium and to prevent the enemy from retreating behind the Somme.

To the center army fell the task, after the crossing of the Meuse, to wheel to the southwest and, by vigorously pressing the attack, to thwart every attempt of the enemy to advance with his reserves into the area between the Meuse and the Oise for a counteroffensive.

The southern army of the Army



*To crack the Maginot Line from behind . . .*

Group, as previously planned, would have to wheel to the south after passing through Luxemburg in order to cover with a defensive front the deep flank of our operation between Meuse and Mosel.

The OKH, nevertheless, did not show any inclination to accept the proposed basic change in the assignment of objectives and in the conduct of the offensive. A repeatedly presented proposal of the Army Group with the same ideas still remained unanswered at the beginning of November.

On 12 November it happened, however. Completely by surprise and at the command of Hitler, Army Group A was assigned the XIX Panzerkorps under General Guderian. Its mission was to be:

"a) To ease the burdens on the Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies by attacking mechanized enemy forces which had advanced into southern Belgium.

b) At, or to the southeast of, Sedan, to seize by surprise the west bank of the Meuse and thereby create a favorable condition for the continuation of the offensive — espe-

cially in the event that operations of the Panzer units assigned to the Sixth and the Fourth Armies (Army Group B) could not be fully developed."

As welcome as the assignment of a Panzerkorps was to the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A in this sense, it soon became clear that it in no way indicated a basic change in the operational concept. Hitler had perhaps realized that a crossing of the Meuse at Sedan would be easier than further north in the zone of the Fourth Army of Army Group B. He hoped that the Panzerkorps could open the Meuse line for them by crossing at Sedan. Concerning the expanding of the objectives and missions of Army Group A according to our proposals to the OKH, there was still no mention. General Guderian saw also, in the now-considered employment of his Panzerkorps, a waste of Panzer strength on secondary objectives. Only after the author introduced him to the operational intentions of the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A was he extremely enthusiastic for the plan of the Army

*. . . seize by surprise the west bank of the Meuse*



Group. It was also his plan that later on was responsible for the flying drive to the Channel coast that thrust our Panzer forces into the back of the enemy.

Also, nowhere in the OKH supplement to its deployment plan, did there appear the thought of establishing a new objective. This being, to seek or to open a way for a decisive conclusion by encircling the enemy from the zone of Army Group A toward the Somme estuary.

Subsequently there continued the business of the on-again off-again orders of Hitler to begin the offensive and his countermanding them because of the weather. The Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A nevertheless did not cease in his efforts to win OKH approval of his operation plan. In the meantime, Hitler concerned himself with the assignment of the XIX Panzerkorps in the zone of Army Group A and with the question: how to supply them with additional forces in the case the attack of the massed Panzer forces with Army Group B would not lead to the rapid successes anticipated? In any case, at the end of November, an order went from Hitler to the OKH to make preparations which would make possible a later shift of the center of gravity of the offensive to Army Group A, should there occur "more rapid and more significant successes than with Army Group B."

Now the concept of a shift of the main effort to Army Group A, *during the course of the operation*, presented itself. This was emphasized by the fact that at the end of November the OKH transferred another mechanized corps (XIV) into the deployment area of Army Group A on the east bank of the Rhine. But it was not specified whether this corps would be assigned to Army Group A or to Army Group B.

In this question, as well as in the question of the assignment of another army to Army Group A, the Commander-in-Chief defended his point of view in further presentations to the OKH. His point was that the decision concerning the shifting of the main effort into his zone, and thereby accepting his plan, could not be made dependent upon the course of the campaign. If one had to wait to see which way

the hare ran, then one would lose the opportunity of cutting off the enemy forces from the south which were expected to be in northern Belgium. Thus the chance to gain a *complete* decision in a further pursuit of the offensive would be lost.

Wide World



**Guderian — the Panzer leader  
was enthusiastic**

The Army Group had to have a third army available to start with. To assign only one Panzerkorps for the thrust through the Ardennes was only a half measure.

Concerning these plans the OKH declared that in general, it was in agreement with the view of the Army Group; however, it was nevertheless restricted by the orders of Hitler. He wanted to make an eventual transfer of the main effort to Army Group A dependent upon the course of the operation. In fact, the original plan of the OKH remained unchanged, solely supplemented by the attachment of the XIX Panzerkorps to Army Group A. This did not even change when details of the movement orders of the Luftwaffe fell into Belgian hands as the result of a German pilot making a forced landing in Belgium.

On 12 January 1940 the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group again presented his ideas concerning the conduct of the offensive in the West via a detailed memorandum to the OKH. Since the OKH placed the blame on Hitler in its refusal to transfer the main offensive effort, ColGen von Rundstedt requested, in a letter of transmittal, that our memorandum be presented to Hitler

personally. The OKH refused this.

On 27 January the author was relieved of his post as Chief of General Staff, Army Group A and was appointed commanding general of one of the new army corps to be organized in the interior of Germany. Yet the result of this was that the operations proposal of Army Group A came officially to the attention of Hitler. On the occasion of the official call of all the newly appointed commanding generals on Hitler, 17 February, he asked the author to remain behind in order to seek his opinion as to how an offensive in the West should be conducted. It is to be assumed that Hitler had heard of this through his senior aide-de-camp, Col Schmudt, who had learned of our opinions during a visit to the Army Group Headquarters. At this opportunity, the author presented to Hitler all the salient points, which according to the views of the Army Group, were vital to the conduct of an offensive in the West:

1) The offensive must strive for and achieve a *total decision* (a possibility which, until then, Hitler had hardly believed).

2) This would require that the *main efforts* of the offensive clearly be placed with Army Group A from the beginning, and not remain with Army Group B or be left unassigned. With this shift of effort to Army Group A, which had to drive through southern Belgium over the Meuse in the direction of the *lower* Somme, the strong enemy forces anticipated in northern Belgium had to be cut off and annihilated while they were being attacked frontally by Army Group B. This had to be the first phase of the campaign. The second phase, the encirclement of the remainder of the French army with our strong right wing, had to follow.

3) For this mission, Army Group A would have to be divided into 3 armies. This would therefore necessitate the intrusion of another army on its north flank. (Missions of the 3 armies of Army Group A have already been discussed.)

4) We dare not commit the half measure of sending the XIX Panzerkorps through the Ardennes alone. This thrust, from the start, had to be led by at least 2 Panzerkorps. The decision to commit the XIV

Mot Corps, therefore, dare not be made primarily dependent upon the conduct of the operation.

Hitler gave his consent to these plans. A few days later the OKH issued a new deployment order, that incorporated those operational proposals for which the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A had fought so long.

For the thrust through the Ardennes, a Panzer group under General von Kleist was formed, which was to include 3 mechanized corps. The southernmost army of Army Group B (Fourth Army) was attached for the time being to Army Group A as a third army. We had previously requested the attachment of the southernmost corps of this army in order to gain more space for maneuver. The additional request for the Second Army (which, after the attainment of the necessary gain of space was to be inserted into the front) actually did not occur until the operation was underway.

The thrust to the lower Somme was made possible through these basic changes in the operations plan. It was to be achieved by cutting off the entire enemy north flank in Belgium. This maneuver brought about the decisive victory in France and was that which Churchill pertinently labeled a "Scythe-cut."

This new plan would guarantee the victory at the same time however, even if the Allied command would have had the courage to undertake a countermove. For the Germans, an all-inclusive counteroffensive between the Meuse and the Oise would have been most dangerous. The new German plan possessed the capability of defeating, by attack, the deployment of the enemy reserve for this counteroffensive even before it began.

#### Observations on the execution of the "new plan"

The attack of Army B in Belgium was an overwhelming success, thanks to the superiority of the German leadership and troops, the co-ordination of the Panzer units and the Luftwaffe. This co-ordination between the air and Panzer units was to be expected in view of the frontal assault type tactics required and the known strength of the Belgian fortifications. Nevertheless, that thrust—led with such audacity through the

Ardennes, over the Meuse toward the Somme estuary—was decisive for the complete destruction of the Allied forces in northern Belgium. It cut off the lines of communication to the rear for the British-French troops remaining in Belgium. The whole command structure was thrown into confusion and a withdrawal of the enemy behind the Somme was prevented. The success in northern Belgium was not as complete as it could have been. The enemy succeeded in evacuating more than 338,000 men over the Channel, even if they did lose their heavy weapons and other equipment.

This has to be blamed on the interference of Hitler, who halted the advancing Panzer units just before Dunkerque. Three versions are known for the reasons which supposedly caused Hitler to take this step. First, he wanted to save the Panzer units for the second phase in France and feared that by an attack on Dunkerque they would suffer all too heavy losses. Another reason was that Goering guaranteed Hitler that the Luftwaffe alone could prevent the evacuation of the British out of Dunkerque. Both arguments, it can be seen, were militarily invalid. The third reason was that Hitler wanted to allow the British to evacuate, because he believed that in this way it would be possible to more easily come to a settlement with Great Britain. Whichever of these three reasons actually led to the halting of the Panzer units close to Dunkerque (maybe all three played a role in Hitler's thoughts), it still remains that permitting the escape of the British army was one of Hitler's fatal mistakes. It prevented him from attempting to invade England and later enabled the British to carry on the war in Africa and Italy.

The Allied Command did not choose to gamble during the withdrawal in northern Belgium by advancing with all available reserves into the southern flank of the German attack for a counteroffensive on both sides of the Meuse, particularly between the Meuse and Oise. They took half measures and thereby made possible the "Scythe-cut." Despite the fact that there were no serious consequences for the German side, at least Hitler carried out one of the op-

erational ideas of "the new plan" as far as the gates of Dunkerque. But he did not carry out the second. Instead of taking the lead by attacking every enemy formation in the area between the Meuse and the Oise and, at the same time—as an introduction for the second phase of the campaign—tearing apart the unity of the enemy front, he merely lined up the reserve units, which followed the attacking armies like beads on a string for the defense of the southern flank of the German operation. An aggressive solution to this covering assignment between the Meuse and the Oise probably appeared to be all too risky to him. He insisted that, under all circumstances, any defeat—even if the thrust to the Channel coast had to be delayed—must be avoided. As was also later to show itself in the Russian campaign, Hitler indeed had a definite instinct for operational questions. However, Hitler lacked the background of a military leader, which makes it possible to undertake an operation even at a great calculated risk because he knows that he can master the situation. Therefore, Hitler chose the safe solution of a defensive deployment on the southern flank in the first phase of the German offensive, instead of taking the daring action, which had been originally proposed by Army Group A. He had the good fortune that the high command on the enemy side did not bring about an all-out counterattack.


So it happened, that after the conclusion of the first phase of the German offensive, both opponents again confronted each other across a continuous front along the Maginot Line, extended to the Aisne and the lower Somme. To start with, the Germans first had to break through this front.

If the second phase of the German offensive led to the complete capitulation of the enemy in such short a time, it was because he could no longer occupy his continuous defensive front from the Swiss border to the sea after the losses in northern Belgium. Furthermore, the fighting spirit of the French army had already suffered a decisive blow; the enemy had no operational Panzer units which were equal to those which the Germans had; and he was hopelessly inferior in the air. USMC

# in brief

☛ *The Commandant* has directed that where facilities permit, commanding officers will encourage recreational rifle and pistol shooting. Some bases have already made range facilities available to recreational shooters and at others the project is under study. The program, inspired by TSgt Don Kelley's article *Let 'Em Shoot* (GAZETTE, Aug '55), will be carried out through the use of both appropriated and non-appropriated funds.

☛ *ATs must be able to hit hard and move out fast.* The French army's answer to the mobility problem is (below) the 40 mph "Scooter Shooter." It is armed with a 75mm recoilless cannon. To fire, the gunner must dismount from the "scooter" and emplace the "shooter."



☛ *A system, tested and proved by the Marine Corps in actual combat in Korea, is the first practical method of conducting all-weather air support operations yet devised.* It incorporates a Radar guidance system that can direct aircraft flying blind onto targets and release bombs with the accuracy of present-day artillery. The most flexible method of control when employing the system is by use of voice commands. The pilot maintains designated altitude and airspeed while course directions as to left turn, right turn and bomb release signal are received via voice radio.

☛ *Marines who qualify as Expert Rifleman 3 times on the "A" Course (not necessarily consecutively) may apply for a specially engraved bar to attach to their Expert Medal.* (See MCM 20100.3)

Marine Corps Gazette • November 1955

☛ *Marine Barracks, Eighth & Eye, was recently the scene of one of the most colorful ceremonies ever held in the Nation's Capital. The regimental band and pipers of Her Majesty's Scots Guards joined the Marine Band and the regular Eighth & Eye troops in a Sunset Parade.*

Marines will recall the Scots Guards in Korea. One battalion of the 3-button (See *The Guards, GAZETTE*, Oct '54) Guards was the adjacent unit to the 1st MarDiv in 1953.

In the US to make a tour of the major cities, the Guards made Washington their first stop. It was natural that they should be the guests of the Marine Corps on such an occasion.

Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador to the US, was the parade's reviewing officer and J. P. L. Thomas, a member of Parliament and First Lord of the Admiralty, was also present. At the right: the Commandant with the Guards' Drum Major.

☛ *An exchange of ground and aviation officers within the FMF staffs will take place shortly. Existing T/Os will be modified to provide billets for ground or avia-*

☛ *Confusion exists regarding eligibility for wearing Reserve-component ribbons and medals and the National Defense Service Medal. Specifications and requirements for these medals and ribbons may be found in the *Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual*, but for the benefit of Association members clarification of certain points is presented here.*

Requirements for the Naval Reserve Medal, The Armed Forces Reserve Medal and the Marine Corps Reserve Ribbon (no medal involved) have one common denominator—a requirement for 10 years' satisfactory service in a Reserve component.

The Organized Marine Corps Reserve Medal is awarded those members of the Reserve who have, in a 4-year period, attended with an Organized Reserve unit; 4 annual field training periods of not less than 14 days each; 80 per cent of all scheduled drills and have had satisfactory service for the period involved.

The National Defense Service Medal is awarded to persons who served on active duty at any time between 27 June 1950 and 27 July 1954 except for Reserve personnel on active duty for training or on short tours of active duty to serve on boards, courts, commissions etc.

☛ *Large as a 4-room bungalow, the expansible trailer (below) was built to serve as a mobile machine shop capable of completely servicing giant "turbo-lectric" propellers for the Air Force. It measures 41 feet in length, is 8 feet wide and 12 and a half feet high when travelling. For operational purposes it expands to provide a completely enclosed workshop 41 x 22 feet in size. Before this trailer was designed, expansible trailers were limited to a maximum of 15-16 feet expanded width.*



# THE BREVET



... for distinguished conduct  
in presence of the enemy



Text and illustrations  
by

LtCol J. H. Magruder, III

THE MARINE CORPS BREVET Medal, ranking immediately after the Medal of Honor, is a unique decoration derived from a custom which played an important part in the first 125 years of the Corps. Although instituted as recently as 1921, its background is steeped in antiquity, and ironically enough, despite its relatively recent adoption, the Brevet Medal already stands with the muzzle loading rifle and the old campaign hat, a relic of the past.

The word *brevet* comes from the Latin *breve*, a word still meaning a "writ" in English legal usage and connoting an order issued under seal in the King's name. Its use in military terminology appears to have begun in France during early feudal times. In the early days of France, each officer served in the French Army by authority of a brevet received from the King. Even today all commissioned officers in the French service, from a sub-lieutenant

# IN THE MARINE CORPS

to a marshal of France, are styled *Officiers à Brévet*. Applied to the American and English military services, however, the brevet came to denote a commission giving an officer higher nominal rank than that for which he received pay.

Brevet rank as we know it was first introduced into the British Army by William III in 1692. At this time British officers held regimental rank only. Their warrants or evidence of office were called commissions and were issued by the Secretary at War to fill vacancies in the tables of organization of the various regiments.

While campaigning in Flanders, William conferred upon one Francis Hawley a brevet to command as colonel of dragoons, and subsequently issued a brevet to a certain lieutenant to command as a captain. Since the French word for commission was *brévet*, it is probable that William chose it to distinguish a commission issued by the Crown, in the army at large, from a normal commission in a regiment.

While the officers breveted in 1692 were significant because they received rank direct from the King rather than from their regiment, the brevet soon became a special reward for British officers who had performed conspicuous services. Such honorary brevets were restricted to captains, majors and lieutenant colonels. However, from 1692 until 1854 the brevet was also employed in promoting all officers to brigadier and general rank since these grades did not exist at regimental level and assignment to such a high position was considered an honor meriting appointment by the King.

At the time of the American Revolution, the use of the brevet was carried over into the Continental Army where it was used principally as a reward to European officers who had offered their services to the colonies. Eighty-two brevets were awarded during that war. Among those honored were Ethan Allen,

Kosciusko, L'Enfant, Pinckney and Winthrop Sargent. Of the total, it would appear that 56 recipients came from Europe.

In 1783, all officers who had faithfully served the cause of Independence were breveted one rank higher as a parting gift from a grateful Congress before they disbanded and returned to their homes. Although the Revolutionary Marine officers serving under Maj Nicholas are not specifically mentioned in the proclamation issued by Congress on 18 October 1783, it can be assumed that they were included since they were part of the Continental forces.

The brevet was originally authorized for the Marine Corps by an act of 16 April 1814, which stated:

"That the President is hereby authorized to confer brevet rank on such officers of the Marine Corps as shall distinguish themselves by gallant actions or meritorious conduct, or shall have served 10 years in any one grade."

The first Marine brevet since the blanket promotions of 1783, was issued on 24 April 1814 to Capt Anthony Gale, appointing him a brevet major in consequence of his having served 10 years in grade as a captain. Captain Samuel Miller, the Adjutant and Inspector, was breveted to major and 1stLt Alfred Grayson, the Quartermaster, received a commission as brevet captain since their capacities as officers on the staff made them eligible for additional pay as specialists. The remaining recipients, Capts Archibald Henderson, Alexander Sevier and Richard Smith received commissions as brevet majors for conspicuous service.

The act of 30 June 1834 putting officers of the Marine Corps, in relation to rank, on the same footing as similar grades in the Army and entitling them to the same pay, also repealed that part of the previous act of 16 April 1814 relating to the granting of brevets for 10 years service in grade. Officers holding such

brevets, however, were permitted to retain their commissions. Thus, the brevet was refined to the status of an honor granted for gallantry only and for the remainder of the 19th Century continued as the sole meritorious award for commissioned officers.

During the Mexican War, brevets were conferred upon 27 Marine officers including 2 future commandants, Jacob Zeilin and Charles Grymes McCawley. No further brevets were issued until the Civil War when 21 such honors were awarded. Again 2 future commandants were included on the list: Charles Grymes McCawley, for the second time, and Charles Heywood.

Following the War Between the States, Congress imposed additional restrictions upon the issuing of brevets. An act of 1 March 1869 authorized that:

"Commissions by brevet shall only be conferred in time of war, and for distinguished conduct and public service in presence of the enemy . . . all brevet commissions to bear date from the particular action or service for which the officer was brevetted."

Between the Civil War and the opening of hostilities with Spain in 1898, only one Marine officer appears to have been brevetted: Capt James Forney who received a brevet as lieutenant colonel "for gallant and meritorious services in the action with the savages at Formosa, 13 July 1867." This outstanding officer had previously received similar honors on two occasions—"for gallantry at Forts Jackson and St. Philip on 24 April 1862" he was appointed a brevet captain and again in July of 1864, for "meritorious services in defeating a rebel raid at Gunpowder Bridge," he was commissioned a brevet major.

From 1898 until 1901, the Marine Corps was active in China, the Philippines and North China. These campaigns produced 24 brevets, which were destined to be the last such honors conferred upon Marine officers. Among those receiving bre-

vets at this time were such well known names as Smedley D. Butler, L. W. T. Waller, Charles L. McCawley, Wendell Neville, John T. Myers, Newt Hall, George Thorpe and David Dixon Porter.

The early history of the brevet commission in the Marine Corps and the privileges pertaining thereto is wrapped in a tangle of confusion which began in 1814 and was not finally adjusted until 1870.

Originally, a brevet did not entitle the officer so honored to the pay and emoluments of the higher rank except when actually occupying a billet calling for his brevet rank; nor did it necessarily carry a right to higher command. A brevetted officer normally continued to exercise the functions of his base rank; thus a captain with the rank of brevet major was usually held to the duties of a captain and continued to draw the pay of that grade. His only reward was the prestige of wearing the insignia and title of his brevet rank. For pay and advancement, the brevetted officer maintained his normal position on the register and awaited full promotion according to his original number on the list.

However, a brevet commission did make an officer *eligible* for command in the higher rank. If he was posted to a vacancy calling for his brevet rank, he assumed the full pay of that rank. In 1843, Col Archibald Henderson, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, was brevetted to brigadier general in recognition of his services in the field against the Creeks and Seminoles. His brevet commission was retroactive to 27 January 1837 when he had commanded a brigade in Florida, so he immediately applied for the back pay to which he was entitled while exercising the functions of a brigadier general during that year.

Questions of eligibility to the pay of brevet rank frequently arose and were inevitably decided with reference to the rank of the officer who normally occupied the particular post in question. Since the act of 30 June 1834 had placed Marine officers on the same footing as similar grades in the Infantry, the right of Marine officers to brevet pay was determined on the basis of the Army's command scale. Thus, the

authority on which Marine officers received brevet pay was the 1825 edition of US Army Regulations.

In Gen Henderson's case, he was entitled to back pay because he had exercised the functions of a brigadier general and, to make his case even stronger, his opposite number, Gen Armistead of the First Brigade, had received the pay to which Henderson aspired as the former commanding officer of the Second.

The Marine Corps Registers of the 1800s read in a criss-cross of confusion to the uninitiated. Complications began with the brevets authorized in 1814 by President Madison pursuant to the act of April 16th of that year. The then-current T/O called for 1 lieutenant colonel commandant, 2 majors, 26 captains and 70 subalterns. In addition to LtCol Wharton and Maj David McCarmick, who held regular line commissions, we find 5 newly appointed brevet majors. Thus, in the Register of Marine Officers for 1815, under the heading "Majors," 2 were listed as per the authorized strength: Carmick, whose basic commission in that grade dated from 1809, and Gale, a major by brevet. The remaining 4 brevet majors headed the officers listed under "Captains."

The act of 3 March 1817 fixing the peace time establishment of the Corps, abolished the rank of major and authorized 1 lieutenant colonel, 9 captains, and 40 subalterns. This act caught a number of Marine officers holding brevets as majors which they were understandably reluctant to relinquish, especially since by so doing they would necessarily revert to captains again. Furthermore, certain of these officers commanding such posts as the Marine Barracks at Philadelphia or Brooklyn felt that they continued to be covered by the proviso of the law pertaining to commands of separate stations or detachments. Their argument was that the act of 1818 had not repealed the former legislation, and that despite the fact that the base rank of major had been dropped from the Corps, the status of brevet rank in that grade was not affected by the new law. Twice their problem went to the Attorney General who both times ruled that since the rank of major no longer existed in the Marine Corps, brevets in that rank could not exist either. This ruling

placed these officers, who had received brevets as rewards for gallant service, in the innocuous position of having a supposedly grateful government revoke the distinctions that it previously had bestowed upon them. Consequently, the brevet majors of the Marine Corps existed in a state of limbo for a number of years. No major's pay being authorized, the highest pay allowable (with the exception of the lieutenant colonel commandant) was that of captain.

A curious situation now transpired. While the Marine Corps continued to refer to its former brevet majors by that rank, the office of the Secretary of the Navy addressed them as "captains" in conformity with the Attorney General's ruling. Thus one found the Secretary of the Navy writing during this period to "Capt John M. Gamble" while that officer in reply persistently signed himself as "Brevet Major." One can only assume that Archibald Henderson staunchly backed his brevet majors in the face of Congress, the Secretary of the Navy and the Attorney General. At least the Corps remained faithful to its own!

That Henderson led a vain attempt to obtain redress for his subordinates is attested to by the following letter:

Headquarters of the Marine Corps  
Washington 1st June 1821

Sir,

The accounts of the Brevet Majors of the Corps are now suspended, and await your decision on their claims for pay agreeable for their Brevet commissions. I would beg leave to refer you to the third section of the Act of the 16th April 1814, entitled 'an act authorizing an augmentation of the Marine Corps, and for other purposes', in support of the legality of their claims.

Majors Smith & Gamble command separate Stations, and a fair military construction would place Major Miller in the same situation. I therefore submit for your decision whether under the before mentioned Act which remains unrepealed, the Brevet Majors in the Corps, 'commanding separate Stations,' are not lawfully entitled to the pay & emoluments of their Brevet rank.

I have the honour to be  
very respectfully

Your obed<sup>t</sup> Ser<sup>t</sup>

Arch'd Henderson  
Lt. Colo. Commt.

The Hono.

Smith Thompson  
Secretary of the Navy

This appeal came to nil from the point of view of pay; but it would appear that the existing brevet-majors continued to assume at least the outer trappings of their abolished rank.

In 1822, when it was desired to promote Capt Robert Wainwright, the Attorney General ruled that since the rank of major did not exist, Capt Wainwright, if deserving promotion at all, was entitled to the brevet rank of lieutenant colonel, which was the next senior rank in the Marine Corps. This "double jump" was not authorized until 1827, when all the previous brevet majors plus Wainwright were promoted to lieutenant colonel by brevet on the basis of the Attorney General's ruling of 1822 and the desire of Headquarters to remove these gentlemen from a shadowy existence in a rank that no longer existed.

In 1834, when the Commandant received the rank of full colonel, majors were again authorized on the Marine Corps list, happily alleviating the confusion that had existed since 1817.

By the time of the Civil War, the problems accompanying the brevet had so mushroomed, especially with the sudden increase in the military and naval establishments, that the act of 3 March 1863 attempted to forestall any further confusion. This was accomplished by the simple expedient of eliminating all entitlement to brevet pay.

In 1869, Congress again tackled the brevet problem which had been aggravated by the many brevets conferred during the War. An act passed on 3 March 1869 stipulated that:

"Brevet rank shall not entitle an officer to precedence or command except by special assignment of the President, but such assignment shall not entitle any officer to additional pay or allowances."

The following year, a law was passed which stripped from the brevet all the trappings except the commission parchment itself. On 15 July 1870 additional legislation was enacted to the effect that:

"Hereafter no officer shall be entitled to wear while on duty any uniform other than that of his actual rank, on account of having been brevetted; nor shall he be addressed in orders or official communications by any title other than that of his actual rank."

The brevet had now become nothing more than a document "suitable for framing" with which to adorn a

wall in the recipient's home. From this date on, recognition of a brevet award was evident only on the register and in the officer's personal file.

Fortunately the increase in the strength of the Marine Corps following the war with Spain enabled most officers receiving brevets to obtain line promotion to their brevet rank soon thereafter. By 1902, all officers had base rank at least equal to their brevet rank with the exception of



Maj Littleton W. T. Waller, who had a brevet as lieutenant colonel, Maj George Richards, assistant paymaster, whose brevet rank was also lieutenant colonel, Capt John T. Myers and Newt H. Hall, who were brevet majors, and 1stLts William G. Powell, Arthur E. Harding and Wade L. Jolly listed as brevet captains.

By the end of WWI a number of decorations had been authorized as rewards for personal acts of heroism: The Medal of Honor, The Army and Navy Distinguished Service Medals, the Navy Cross and the Army's Distinguished Service Cross. As each of these provided tangible evidence of the award in the ribbon or medal that was worn, while no badge had ever accompanied the brevet commission, the Marine Corps sought to provide a medal that would bring recognition to its officers holding this honor.

Accordingly, on 12 April 1921, MajGen Commandant John A. Lejeune recommended to the SecNav that as a means of public recognition, an appropriate badge or medal be authorized and presented to Marine officers holding brevet commissions. Upon the Secretary's favorable endorsement, Quartermaster General Charles L. McCawley supervised the preparing of a suitable medal. The actual design was the work of Quartermaster Sergeant Joseph A. Burnett, USMC, and was finally selected on 7 June 1921 when it was officially prescribed as an article of uniform for the Marine Corps.

Marine Corps Order #26, in deciding the relative importance of the Brevet Medal, prescribed that it "be worn in the position immediately after that of the badge for the campaign in which the brevet was awarded." By 1929 it had been moved up to rank just after The Distinguished Flying Cross, but it was not until 1937 that its full importance was recognized and the Brevet Medal was ranked after the Medal of Honor.

Twenty-four Brevet Medals were struck off by the US Mint. The medal was cast in bronze and shaped in the form of a modified cross patee in the center of which was a medallion inscribed "Brevet United States Marine Corps." On the reverse side appeared the legend "For distinguished conduct in presence of enemy." The cross hung from a hinged Marine Corps emblem suspended from a deep crimson ribbon bearing three chevrons of white stars.

In 1921 there were only 23 Marine officers still alive who had received brevet commissions and hence were eligible for the Brevet Medal. James Forney received the Brevet Medal in recognition of 3 brevet promotions while Louis J. Magill was so honored for 2 brevets. All the rest had been promoted by brevet once, mostly during the period 1898 to 1900 covering the Spanish American War and operations in the Philippines and North China.

The Marine Corps Brevet Medal occupies a distinctive place in military heraldry. Awarded in only 23 cases as recognition of a form of honor already obsolete at the time of its presentation, it stands unique among military decorations. USMC

# passing in review

BOOKS OF  
INTEREST TO  
OUR READERS

## America's Global Strategy . . .

US MILITARY DOCTRINE: A STUDY AND APPRAISAL — Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, USAF. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955. 256 pages. \$3.50

THE INFLUENCE OF FORCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS — Captain W. D. Puleston, USN (Ret). New York: D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1955. 254 pages. \$4.50

AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE ATOMIC AGE — Colonel George C. Reinhardt, USA (Ret). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955. 236 pages. \$3.75

*US Military Doctrine* could be more honestly titled "US Strategic Bombing Doctrine." Well turned out in historical trappings, it is nevertheless a polemic echoing the Air Force line.

The author discards our well-worn, but still sound, 9 principles of war. To replace them he sets up 4 of his own. They are: military professionalism, unity of command, celerity with the counteroffensive and technical application. He traces the development of these in American history and backs them up with an array of historical precedent.

"Professionalism" and "unity of command" spring from Washington's "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment." "Unity of Command" is also reflected in the intent of the Constitution's framers to provide only a War Department to conduct all matters of national defense. "Celerity with the counteroffensive" is seen as stemming from doctrines of Clausewitz and Jomini as interpreted by Denis Hart Mahan at West Point. Celerity is now embodied in the "massive retaliation" doctrine. "Technical application" was first understood by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Recognition that the proper and successful conduct of war changes rapidly with technological advance was his signal contribution to American doctrine.

These principles, and their largely American historical origins, so laboriously hammered home by the author, are a novel approach to the theory of war. Little fault can be found with them or their impressive lineage. They are, of course, equally applicable to

services other than the Air Force and are being so applied.

This book, however, applies these principles to the Air Force with all the perennial arguments associated with the protagonists of that arm. Again the attempt is made to sell us on the same timeworn clichés: air power would have won in 1918 had not Germany collapsed; Billy Mitchell was sacrificed on the altar of military traditionalism; air power won WWII in both theaters and would have won sooner if fewer resources had been diverted to other arms; Korea could have been won had not air power been restricted to south of the Yalu.

In an attempt to make nuclear bombardment palatable, the author rejects any idea of preventive war. Our "new doctrine" of massive retaliation, he likens to the sheriff of the old West — always poised and waiting, never starting a fight but always quicker on the draw when one starts. This is the principle of celerity with the counteroffensive. It is to be achieved by a highly professional personnel, a unified command and proper technical application of newly developed weapons and equipment.

General Smith naturally announces these as his personal views and disclaims any official inspiration. Notwithstanding this disclaimer we can only observe that this line has been heard before.

Captain Puleston takes a different line. To him, to sit back waiting for the enemy to launch his nuclear attack and then try to be quicker on the draw is to commit national suicide. Rather, says he, if we gained "positive evidence" that the enemy was mounting an attack against us we should alert our forces and issue an ultimatum for them to dismount their attack. If they did not, we would strike. This has a certain realism not apparent in Smith's "quicker on the draw" doctrine yet it has one flaw. The Captain does not tell just how we get the "positive evidence" of the impending attack. Detection of the mounting of an air attack from bases deep in Eurasia is much more difficult than detection of the mounting of a surface attack from just over the border. The record of our intelligence efforts in making such predictions is somewhat less than impressive, to wit: Pearl Harbor, Kasserine Pass, the Ar-

dennes Offensive and North Korea's and Communist China's invasions of Korea. Are we justified in assuming a higher grade of intelligence on a much more difficult and vital problem?

This is Puleston's answer to the present problem of global strategy. He evolves it from a historical analysis of the threat of force in international affairs particularly with reference to keeping the peace. This country has ever been physically and psychologically unprepared for war. This, plus our lack of diplomatic and military co-ordination, has been responsible for our failure to avoid war and our failure to win the peace. These failures are in marked contrast to the classic diplomacy of Europe and the balance of power concept which served it well for long periods.

Although there can be no real winner in the next conflict, one nation or alliance will come out the stronger loser and will dictate the peace terms. To be that nation, we will do well to heed much of Puleston's advice.

The author's closing note is that success of the United Nations would make the world static and so, stagnant. In spite of war's toll, he says, most of the world's progress has been the by-product of war. An intelligent observer, he says, might well conclude that war was the instrument chosen by the modern world to secure its rapid development. This is a provocative view but, for moral reasons alone, not one calculated to achieve wide acceptance.

While Gen Smith presents strategic air's version of military doctrine and Capt Puleston advocates *real politik*, Col Reinhardt, in his *American Strategy in the Atomic Age*, presents an all-service view of America's global strategy and the military doctrine to implement it.

Reinhardt writes from several sound assumptions. The harsh realities of geopolitics demands that, at all costs, we oppose the domination of the Eurasian land mass by a single power or Communist union and attempt to restore the balance of power there. Containment, as a policy, is essentially negative and has failed. Rather, reliance should be placed on deterrent power and less dependence on the local defensive power set up by the containment policy. The

strategy of a final hydrogen showdown is sterile in that it limits our freedom of action and favors continuation of the cold war which is the Soviet's path of victory. Deterrent power is best achieved by balanced forces. These are balanced not as to dollars appropriated to each service but as to weapons systems appropriate to the particular task. They should be composed of powerful task forces which include an array of nuclear weapons. These, rather than "one-weapon" forces, pose the real threat to the enemy in that they can strike anywhere, in any degree and under any condition. Russian space has always defeated penetrations. Nevertheless, Russian expansion has often been thwarted by successful peripheral wars. These have caused withdrawals to Russia's borders and often crippling internal dissension.

How does Reinhardt propose to meet these situations? First, by a sound defense structure composed of four elements: A Navy to command the sea lanes thereby assuring our flow of raw materials and link-up with our allies; powerful balanced nuclear-armed task forces composed, as appropriate, of all service elements, to exercise our deterrent power — this in marked contrast to the weak divisions sent initially to Korea; a nuclear armed strategic air command, even as envisioned by Gen Smith, poised ready to strike, itself a deterrent to any action by the enemy against our home bases in retaliation over the exercise of normal deterrent power; and finally a continental defense to minimize the danger of enemy retaliation.

Second, by the creation of areas of strength ringing the enemy and manned by loyal allies. This is recognized as a diplomatic problem, but our hand must be strengthened by our fully balanced military power.

And third, by taking up a flanking position from strong bases in the Middle East which would threaten the flank of any Soviet action to east or west.

By such a threat, he believes, as throughout history, Russia sooner or later would be forced to the negotiation table, would eventually withdraw to her own borders and even internal revolt might ensue.

In brief, *US Military Doctrine* really presents strategic bombing doctrine. *The Influence of Force* makes a plea for the United States to come of age and act realistically from its position of strength. *American Strategy in the Atomic Age* pulls these ideas together and adds many more. It is a penetrating analysis of the problems of global strategy confronting us and the best means to meet those problems.

Reviewed by LtCol Brooke Nihart

## Salty Prose . . .

### SEA FIGHTS AND SHIPWRECKS:

True Tales of the Seven Seas — Hanson W. Baldwin. Garden City: Hanover House, 1955. 315 pages. \$3.95

This is a book of disaster on the seas. Eighteen of the greatest tragedies of nautical history, some familiar, others little known, are gathered in *Sea Fights and Shipwrecks* to provide several hours of top-notch entertainment. Hanson Baldwin has spanned a century and a half to include the horrible wreck of the French frigate *Medusa* in 1816 down through the last great battle of World War II between "the fleet that came to stay" and the Japanese Kamikazes off Okinawa in 1945.

Each story is a complete, actual episode, and to satisfy the student of naval history, each is followed by instructive notes and acknowledgments. Some of the pieces have been published previously in various magazines including *Naval Institute Proceedings*, *Harpers* and *Esquire*. All are highly readable.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf has been treated at some length. This battle, which the author calls "perhaps the world's last great fleet action," has been the source of some controversy in naval circles and the narrative is followed by illuminating comments by the participating US fleet commanders, Admirals Kinkaid and Halsey. A dose of mystery is supplied by *The Strange Case of the Mary Celeste*, brigantine, come upon

extinction for the crew of the sunken Japanese submarine *Number Six*, stuck fast in the mud at the bottom of Hiroshima Bay — all these are told.

Throughout the book, and particularly in the account of the great 1944 typhoon which punished the Third Fleet as no enemy could, the reader cannot but be impressed with the terrifying mightiness of the sea. Witness the last hours of USS *Monaghan*, DD 354, veteran of 12 battles: ". . . the wind pushes *Monaghan* far on her starboard side. She struggles to rise again. . . . In the after deck house . . . men cling to stanchions and pray. . . . Then, about noon, the wind brutalizes her; heavily *Monaghan* rolls to starboard . . . 30, 40 . . . 60, 70 degrees — tiredly she settles down flat on her side to die amid a welter of white waters and the screaming Valkyries of the storm. And there go with her 18 officers and 238 men. . . ."

Man, haughty in his conquest of man and atom, is not yet, nor may never be, the master of his environment. Mr Baldwin identifies the sea as "probably the greatest environmental influence in the development of man." This influence, colored by man's romantic attachment to the sea, is the dominating theme through all these stories. ". . . there is no ship afloat that cannot be capsized in a seaway."

Hanson Baldwin, well-known as a military and naval writer, in retelling these stories has effected a fine balance of drama and salty authenticity to make this book dandy reading.

Reviewed by Capt W. D. Merrill

## Horse Heroine . . .

### RECKLESS, PRIDE OF THE MARINES

—Andrew Geer. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 224 pages, illustrated. \$3.50

Here is a horse story not in the same stall with *My Friend Flicka* and others of the same genre. Actually, "story" is a misnomer. This is the history of a minor legend of the Marine Corps. Thousands of Marines knew "Reckless" by sight, thousands more knew of her exploits.

The foal of a Korean race horse named Morning Flame, Reckless inherited the devotion and services of Flame's trainer and jockey, Kim Huk Moon. When the Communist tide swept down from the north in June of 1950, the two are thrown together into the chaos of misery and flight that is such an old, old story in Korea. A time comes when Kim is forced to sell his pet in order to obtain an artificial leg for his wounded sister. Bought by the 75mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon of the 5th Marine Regiment and trained to carry ammunition, the little mare was nicknamed for the weapon she



in the Atlantic, 23 days out of New York, sailing erratically with not a living soul aboard. The mystery is unsolved to this day. The tragic sinking of the unsinkable *Titanic*, and the broad daylight collision of Her Majesty's Ships *Victoria* and *Camperdown* in the port of Tripoli, 1893, were events which shook the world in their times. The inglorious end of *Admiral Graf Spee*, commerce raider; death on a Cape Verde for *Garthpool*, last of Britain's square-riggers, in 1929, "a mouldering monument to an age that is gone;" dark, stale

**At Headquarters Marine Corps  
and Quantico**

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served. By her steadiness under fire combined with a taste for beer, coke, vitamin pills and other exotic fare, she gains the love and respect of her new masters. After the truce, a wounded and cited veteran of Reno, Carson and Vegas, Reckless is "rotated" to Camp Pendleton, California to well earned retirement.

This book has a much less specialized appeal than the title would seem to indicate. The lot of the Korean peasant is pictured in vivid detail, the poverty, squalor and attendant suffering under Japanese domination, the plight of an ancient people in a modern war. To Marines who fought in Korea in the later stages, the saga of Reckless will be a rollof names, places and events for reminiscence.

Readers of Col Geer's earlier books, *The Sea Chase* and *The New Breed*, will approach this one with a predisposition towards enjoyment. Few will be disappointed. . . .

Reviewed by Capt R. R. Rall Jr

**Civil War Guidebook . . .**  
DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE CIVIL  
WAR—LtCol Joseph B. Mitchell.  
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 226  
pages. \$4.00

This fine book is an excellent "big picture" view of the Civil War. LtCol

Mitchell has done an outstanding job of providing a short, concise, easily read guidebook to the decisive battles. In writing this brief history he has not omitted any of the essential information needed for an understanding of each important Civil War battle and that battle's relationship to the war as a whole.

This book is designed to accomplish two things: "to present a short history of the Civil War with its events and leaders in their proper perspective" and "to place its battles and campaigns in modern, up-to-date surroundings." In accomplishing his stated purpose the writer is most successful.

In the first chapter the reader is deftly and quickly introduced to the underlying causes behind the War and the background perspective. From this point the reader progresses from Fort Sumter to Manassas, and on through the Seven Days, Second Manassas, Gettysburg and many more of the battles including campaign of the West. All the battles discussed are shown in their proper relationship to one another in a very clear but at the same time brief manner of presentation.

The student of Civil War history will find this book a most valuable aid in keeping the major events of the War "in their proper place in relation to the whole war effort." The occasional reader of military history will be able to familiarize himself with the Civil War campaigns without perusing a series of tedious tomes.

Perhaps the best "selling point" of *Decisive Battles of the Civil War* is the unique approach to the map problem. All too often in books written about military campaigns the maps are most difficult to follow. This problem is neatly solved here by depicting each battle on modern road maps and indicating where the new road net differs from the old.

Many of the battles of the Civil War—both battles of Manassas—Antietam—Fredericksburg—Chancellorsville—Gettysburg (to name but a few) are within easy driving distance of many Marine posts.

With LtCol Mitchell's book in hand, the family in the car and with a picnic lunch, an instructive and also a relaxing interlude is readily available.

This book should be of particular interest to the officer attending or expecting to attend the Junior School, since each year the Junior School class takes a Historical Ride to the Gettysburg Battlefield.

The author of *Decisive Battles of the Civil War* is well qualified not only in the military field but as a historian. A West Pointer and regular Army officer until 1954, he is also a graduate of the

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Field Artillery School at Fort Sill and the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. For the past four years he has been Chief of the Historical Division of the American Battle Monuments Commission.

Reviewed by Maj J. D. Case



### Supersonic Flight Survey . . .

**SOUND BARRIER**—Neville Duke and Edward Lanchbery. New York: Philosophical Library Inc. 129 pages, illustrated and indexed. \$4.75

With aircraft like the F-100 Super Sabre frequently cracking speed records, publishers have difficulty keeping pace with the revolutionary developments of this sonic age. Nor does the curtain of censorship, draped over the latest aeronautical advances by both East and West, make the job any easier. Despite these handicaps *Sound Barrier* manages to keep within a step of the newest designs in the field of aviation.

The book was first published about a year ago and its immediate success necessitated 4 reprintings. However, with newer aircraft turning the sound barrier into a mere door to future progress the book soon became a back issue. Consequently, to keep in step with current, unclassified developments, the authors have published this enlarged, up-to-date revision.

Actually the book could aptly be titled *Heat Barrier* because the authors—along with aeronautical scientists—have turned their gaze toward this next frontier. To do this the book traces the historic steps that led to the design of such aircraft as the stiletto-nosed Douglas X-3, the VTO fighters and the F-100.

*Sound Barrier* is divided into 4 parts. The first, "Supersonic and High-Altitude Flying," is devoted to a survey of the problems of flight in the transonic and supersonic regions and how sustained "speed-of-sound flight plus" and the sonic "bangs" it generates may be a potentiality as a weapon of warfare.

Next, in "Design for Speed," the development of the jet engine and the airframe design are covered. Also in this section the physiological effects of high-speed flight and altitude flying upon pilots and crews are discussed and the progress being made to cope with these problems is explained.

The third section, "Design for Use,"

deals with the design of representative types of jet fighters, bombers and civil airliners. This section also explains how a compromise between the ideal theoretical aircraft and practical considerations is reached.

And, in the final chapter, the authors predict "Things to Come." The first 3 parts are objective reporting upon the history and evolution of high speed flying. However, in these final pages the authors change to the personal and speculative. Planes without landing gears? A 3-stage nest of aircraft capable of launching the third stage at 60,000 feet at a speed of Mach 2? The artificial satellite? All these questions are answered with logical explanations in this last chapter.

To shunt this book aside with the thought that *Sound Barrier* is a technical volume of interest only to the jet jockey would be a mistake. The evolution of jet propulsion and its associated speeds is of vital concern to all—particularly those in the military. And the authors have done an excellent job of telling this story for the general, non-technical reader. It gives one an insight into the manner in which the team of designer, aerodynamicist, engineer, physicist and pilot plan the campaign for their conquest of the sky.

Production of this book was no small chore for the two English authors. It

required "translation" of numerous technical works and data to produce this interesting, easy-to-digest book. The only fault we find with the book is that it deals almost entirely with American and United Kingdom aircraft. But with all Communist aircraft development classified and the USA and the UK far ahead of the rest of the western powers, this is understandable.

Reviewed by Maj T. J. Saxon

### One Man Army . . .

**COMMANDO EXTRAORDINARY**—Charles Foley. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 238 pages, illustrated. \$3.75

For a week during the Ardennes break-through by the Germans in December 1944, Gen Eisenhower was imprisoned in his own headquarters. He was confined as stringently as any erring ranker is to barracks.

He fretted, he pleaded, he stormed—but his security chiefs were unmoved. Even in his own offices there was no guarantee against attack. Outside the closely guarded buildings assassins waited to kill or kidnap him. They wore American uniforms and spoke English. Above all, they said, there was a man, a German . . .

Unknown to Eisenhower, one of his staff who resembled the general, took

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
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Kaman HOK-1 helicopter rescuing flood victim in Farmington, Conn., area. (Hartford Times Photo)

## HELICOPTERS SAVE HUNDREDS OF LIVES DURING FLOOD

Dramatic rescues by rotary wing aircraft became almost commonplace in the gray rain of August 19, 1955.

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on the additional duty of acting as double for the Supreme Commander. In this role he drove daily from Paris to Versailles in the famous 5-starred automobile.

Paris itself was under curfew. Tanks patrolled near the Cafe de la Paix, for here the leader of the assassins was expected hourly to drop in for an apertif. People in the streets were stopped to prove their identity. American officers were as sharply questioned as enlisted men. High ranking staff officers rushing from one conference to another found road-blocks in the way. Badges of rank now meant nothing and passwords were distrusted. Even the white-helmeted Military Police who led this inquisition did not escape suspicion.

Montgomery was taking over part of the ruptured American front during this period. His liaison officers, speeding through ice and snow, found sub-machine guns thrust over the frosted windshields of their jeeps. "Who is Pruneface?" a hoarse voice would demand. "Where does L'il Abner live?" "Who works with Jiggs?" British officers who could not answer such questions were put under arrest. No chances could be taken—and none were.

All this because of one man, and the legend which had grown up around him. A man with a name so charged with menace that the mere rumor of his presence behind the lines was enough to dismay an army and incarcerate its commander-in-chief—a man who on New Year's Eve received the Mention Clasp of the German army for staving off front-line attacks in the Malmedy area during the period 18-28 December—the very week during which Eisenhower was held at Versailles. Who was this man, and how did he achieve such fame?

*Commando Extraordinary* is a vivid and exciting account of Otto Skorzeny's remarkable exploits in World War II, from his initial combat on the Russian front as a line officer to his surrender to American forces and subsequent trial as a war criminal at Dachau. In detail are set down the rescue of Mussolini from his prison on the crags of the Gran Sasso, by the special glider borne force led by Skorzeny and the kidnapping of the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy, before that individual could execute a planned capitulation of his government to the Russians. Operation Greif which caused so much consternation in Paris, and which kept Eisenhower caged—an operation conceived only to hold the Meuse River bridges following the Ardennes break-through, and in reality did not include the capture or assassination of Eisenhower, is covered in the same meticulous manner. The trial of Skorzeny at Dachau, and

his partial exoneration by one of his counterparts in the British service, Yeoman Thomas (*The White Rabbit*) furnish particularly interesting information on the legal aspects of the activities of special units behind the lines during time of war.

Author Foley completes his excellent narrative with a short discourse on Skorzeny's opposite "on the other side of the hill" and compares Skorzeny's training methods and exploits with those of David Stirling's Special Air Service, and closes with a recommendation that the armed forces of the West raise a Strategic Assault Corps—not for the purpose of raiding enemy coast lines as Commandos might, but rather, as Skorzeny and Stirling did, to strike deep into the rear of the enemy—to the very seat of his government if necessary and there, by the threat of assassination or wholesale destruction of that government by atomic or other mass destruction weapons, prevent the fatal order being given which could plunge our world into chaos.

*Commando Extraordinary* reads as smoothly as a novel, presents the reader with knowledge of special forces and their capabilities, and more than that, gives us all pause for thought as to what such forces could and would do to wreck our own war potential if utilized in the atomic age.

Reviewed by Maj G. P. Averill

**Tommy Atkins . . .**

THE BRITISH SOLDIER—Col H. de Watteville. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 242 pages, illus. \$4.00  
World War II brought the United States and Great Britain into a "Grand Alliance" and the progress of international tensions since then has caused a strengthening of the relationship. At the governmental level the tie finds significant expression in NATO while duty abroad and, until recently, service in Korea have enlarged the bond of mutual respect between the United States military man and his British counterpart. Long the friend and admirer of that sterling "Digger" from "down under" the United States Marine has had little opportunity until Korea to get to know the equally splendid British soldier and Royal Marine.

Thus, Col H. de Watteville's *The British Soldier* provides us with further opportunity to know him and, particularly, the events which have made him the man he is today. The author has set down, with the meticulous care born of deep respect and understanding, the history of the British Regular soldier for the purpose of depicting his day-to-day life and its effect in his evolution. From the Battle of Crécy in 1346 to the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, he portrays the English men-at-arms as the

military antecedents of the regular soldier. We see them as the forbears who provided the foundation upon which the soldier's tradition grew.

Then, through 3 centuries of war and peace, from the Regular's Army's birth, with the accession of Charles II, through WWII the life of the soldier in all its aspects is recreated for us. His background, education, social standing and attitude; his pay and allowances, quarters and rations; the ups and downs of his national popularity; the evolution of his discipline and his punishments; the subtle and non-so-subtle techniques involved in his recruitment; his duty in peace and service in war; the soldier's wife; and the good and bad of his officers are all given due treatment in relation to the times and in regard to their lasting influence on the Army and its traditions.

Colonel de Watteville has written with dedication an absorbing account full of interesting detail and true incident. Aside from the worth-while background provided for present and future understanding of our British ally, the military reader, in this era of relative opulence for his kind, will find himself sometimes incredulous, often amused, and continually sympathetic at what has been the fare of the British Regular across the centuries. Time and again one will be struck by the truism that the soldier is indeed the mirror of his times, his evolution through the years providing an accurate image of the changing society from which he has sprung.

The author's careful appraisal of the fighting qualities of the British soldier throughout history in the face of varying social-economic circumstances is a worthwhile study which, when taken in its broadest aspects, provides the military reader with much food for thought.

Reviewed by Maj J. M. Sherwood

#### Do Something About It . . .

The Marine Corps Institute has opened for enrollment a new course, *Weather Observing* (S-T530.7), which should be of great value to all Marine weathermen (MOS 6811) as well as other Marines interested in weather forecasting.

*Weather Observing* is designed to explain the fundamentals of weather instruments, observation techniques and natural phenomena.

Included in the course are descriptions and explanations of such related particulars as clouds, hydrometers, wind, pressure, precipitation, electronic observations and data for setting up and operating a weather station. The text gives numerous examples of the use of tables, charts and other items necessary to a study of the subject.



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
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# 180th Anniversary



On November 10, 1955, the United States Marine Corps will have completed 180 years of service. It is a day for remembering — and a day for rededication. In the long span of years from the modest beginnings to the present, Marines have served the Nation with honor and distinction. This is our heritage — a heritage of which we are justly proud. But there is time for only a brief backward glance. The destiny of our Nation and of our Corps lies ahead.

A small but always ready combat force prepared for immediate service anywhere, anytime, the Marines have a distinctive role. The need for such a force is fundamental. New weapons and new concepts have not made it less urgent. If anything, the role of such a force has become more significant. The Marine Corps, prepared faithfully to do its job in large wars or small, has filled this need in the past and will do so in the future, so long as we continue to be worthy of the name Marine. This is our rededication on the birthday of our Corps. It is a task for all Marines everywhere — regular and reserve, officer and enlisted. Thus as we look back with pride let us look forward with confidence and determination.

Let us readdress ourselves, too, to the task of maintaining the spirit of comradeship and brotherhood in arms throughout the ranks, which is the tradition of the Corps, for it is this vital force which has made our formations peerless on the field of battle. It is in this spirit that I extend my best wishes to all Marines and their families on this 180th birthday.

Quentin C. Murphy

